THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way" — however dimly, and
lost among the host — as does the evening star
to those who tread their path in darkness.

— *The Voice of the Silence*

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NORMAN ANGELL

The Foundations of European Peace

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"Sir Norman Angell, the famous author of a truly epoch-making book, *The Great Illusion,* is a persevering and an indefatigable worker in the cause of Peace. He is an educator of rare parts and has the gift of presenting facts so as to make them self-evident and at most times incontestable. In this article he not only has presented the problem which European civilization has to solve or perish, but also has clearly set forth the principles without which it cannot be solved.—ED. [1939]"

The cogency of what Sir Norman wrote a few months before the beginning of World War II has only been reinforced by the world's experiences since then. What he put forward are the foundations of peace for all nations.—ED.]

THE MILLIONS of Europe, the peoples, ardently desire peace. Why then do they get war?

If it be replied that dictators or capitalists or armament-makers force them into it against their will, it is clear that we have not examined the meaning of the words we use. A single dictator or a group of twenty, or two hundred, or even two thousand capitalists or armament-makers cannot "force" millions. The force is on the side of the millions, not on the side of a dozen or a few score elderly, obese gentlemen. That the obese gentlemen for their own purposes may desire a nation to go to war and tell it so to do, is conceivable. But why does the nation obey, since the power is on the side of the people? The explanation is that *the mind of the people has been captured by certain ideas and values,* by belief in the advantage of conquest; or in glory; or in nationalism, or patriotism; or in the suppression of this or that race or class or party — ideas which the few or the one may exploit. But it is, in the last analysis, by manipulating those things of the mind that men are brought to wage war. In so far as force enters to compel them, *the force which coerces the people is*

supplied by the people themselves as the result of persuasion; of capturing their will.

But for the existence of a certain set of ideas in people's minds, special interests would be powerless to push whole nations to war. If, for instance, the building industry (even more considerable than the armament industry) could bring about the destruction by fire of some great city like London, or Birmingham, or Bombay, all concerned in that industry — the manufacturers of bricks, cement, steel, glass, and the rest — would make perfectly enormous profits and those who own shares in such industries would make great fortunes. But if the capitalists controlling that industry were to ask the citizens of London or Bombay to burn down those cities, would it be done? It would not. The capitalists in that case are quite impotent to impose their wishes, however ardent those wishes might be. But they are quite successful in imposing their will about the blowing of cities to pieces with bombs, or in inducing the public to buy the instruments for the purpose of doing that thing. How do we account for the fact that in the one case it is so easy to bend the will of the people to the desires of a small minority (if that *is* the explanation of war) and in the other case, where the economic motive is just as great, it is not possible at all?

In both cases the success of the minority depends upon reaching the public mind. When Adolph Hitler started his political career his following numbered about ten persons, and it would have remained a party of ten persons unless he had been able to appeal successfully to certain passions of the public — mainly the pugnacities, animosities, hates, desires related to nationalism; passions so strong that those who yield to them become oblivious of where they are being led, what they are sacrificing.

The most deeply rooted of all impulses or instincts is, of course, that of self-preservation since without it living things could not have continued to exist. And if we analyse a little objectively the motives which have induced millions in Europe to follow a path which leads to their own destruction, we shall find, despite the apparent paradox, that the first and dominant motive has its roots in self-preservation, defence.

We know that the impulse of self-preservation, obeyed without regard to change of external circumstance, without intelligent recognition of that change, can operate to our destruction. When the passengers of a ship, in case of collision, make a panic rush for the boats, they are obeying an instinct of self-preservation which might have been preservative when it prompted an animal or a herd to take to flight when danger appeared. But panic, disorderly flight, in the case of passengers on a ship will end by destroying them. So in the case of the nations. *Every nation in the world is adopting a method of defence which, when adopted by*

all, ends by making the defence of any impossible. What is the essence of that method? Each great power broadly takes the line: If we are to be secure, we must be stronger than any likely to challenge us. It proceeds to make itself thus stronger than a potential rival as the indispensable condition of defence. What becomes, in that case, of the defence of the weaker? If superiority of power is indispensable to defence, the weaker has no defence.

Clearly that method starts with a violation of right and ethics in that the stronger denies to the weaker that right of defence by superior power which the former claims.

When this very elementary ethical truth is pointed out the retort sometimes is that a householder does not deny right when he barricades his house against the burglar; that Britain therefore denies no right when it makes itself impregnable.

But that reply ignores the whole nature of international relationship. "Defence" is not a matter of keeping out foreigners. Britain has not been faced by the problem of repelling foreigners from its soil since the Norman invasion. But the British army has fought in every country of the world, and the Englishman would do well to ask himself why, if defence really means locking the doors against the intruder, he is so often to be found in other peoples' houses.

In fact, however, it does not mean that war is necessarily aggressive because it happens to be fought on some one else's soil. For defence means the defence of legitimate interests, rights, arising out of such questions as whether trading ships can pass through a particular sea uninterruptedly, whether food can be brought in security from distant lands, traders live in safety, necessary materials obtained, and much else of the same character.

But if defence means the defence of what we believe to be our rights, the claim for superior power as the instrument of such defence puts us in a moral dilemma even worse than that just sketched. The position might be indicated as one in which a great state says to another: "Although we ask for superior power it will never be used except for defence. That is to say, when we get into a dispute with you as to our respective rights and interests, and the question is whether you are right or we are right, what we mean by defence is that we alone shall be judge of that question, and shall always be in a position to impose our judgement." The denial of right in that case becomes more outrageous than ever. The weaker is denied the right of judgement which the stronger claims.

Now if one examines the outstanding facts of the international situation in Europe this last thirty years (or for that matter this last three hundred), one sees that that dilemma lies at the root of the whole trouble.

The nations seek to give expression to the instinct of self-preservation in such a way that the preservation and defence of one is secured by depriving another of it. Obviously that must ultimately lead to conflict.

The first impulse of those who realize at all deeply this dilemma is to say that in order to secure peace men must give up the claims for defence, or at least for armed defence. *And if indeed men could be induced to do that, never to possess arms at all, obviously the problem of war would be solved. It is an extremely attractive doctrine, and much more practicable than would appear at first sight*; and nothing but good can come of making the public more familiar with the arguments by which it may be supported. But three main considerations have to be taken into account.

The first is that the new or revived phenomenon of Fascism presents aspects of the problem which were not urgent a quarter of a century ago. If, to put the case concretely, a party pledged to refrain from the use of arms could be returned to power in, say, Great Britain, the first result of an unarmed government would not be a foreign invasion, but the seizure of the government by an armed party within Great Britain itself, a party approximating in its outlook to the armed parties which in so many countries of Europe have seized the reins of government. If that happened what would a government pledged to pacifism do? Would it resist the armed assault upon the constitution? If so, it would be in a position of being ready to use arms against its own countrymen, but not against foreigners. If it did *not* resist the assault of the armed rebels, then the government would be taken over by that armed group, perhaps representing a quite small minority, who would thereupon imprison all pacifists, teach the children of the nation to love violence, train them in military-mindedness, and hopes of peace by that road would certainly be for a long time deferred.

In order to prevent that outcome the question arises whether the use of force need involve the moral dilemma which has been sketched above. The essence of that dilemma was that if each nation is its own defender, and a strong one is in conflict with a weak one, the weak has no defence, and the stronger becomes the judge of every dispute between them. Organized society within the nation has, however, managed to escape from that dilemma by neutralizing the power of the stronger party so that force, violence, does not become the means of determining the merits of the dispute. If having had a quarrel with my neighbour about some money matter, I enter his house in order to take his property, because I believe that I am entitled so to do, my neighbour sends for the policeman, who however *does not settle the dispute*. He knows nothing of the dispute. He merely prevents me from settling it; prevents the use of my violence. Being thus restrained from making myself the judge, and from

using my violence to enforce my judgement, I may be willing to turn to third-party judgement, law, custom, tradition, to things other than violence. That in civilized society is the real purpose of armed force — to render impossible the use of violence to determine disputes, or to put it in different terms, to see that force instead of being the instrument of rival litigants in which the superior strength of one party is the final arbiter, becomes the instrument of the law — the law against violence, so that some factor other than violence can be brought into play.

The problem which confronts European civilization is to find the road by which (it may be slowly and bit by bit) force can be transferred from the litigants to the law, the law that there shall be no war.

The theory of the thing is plain enough, simple enough. The difficulty is in its practical application. And yet applied it must be if the present anarchy is not to end in the destruction of all civilization. However difficult the application may be it is certain that it could have been successfully applied on occasions in the past seven or eight years when it has not been applied, *if only public opinion had been more insistent.* It has not been insistent because understanding of the right principle has not been very clear or very profound. Ever since 1931 when Japan began the invasion of China, European opinion has been greatly confused, sometimes rendered impotent, by the failure to distinguish between the problem of restraining violence, of preventing its use to settle a dispute, and the problem of deciding the merits of a given dispute. Instead of concentrating upon the one supreme purpose of preventing violence, instead of saying, whether it be Japan or Italy or Germany: "Whatever the rights and wrongs of this dispute our main concern is to see that violence does not settle it, that the more powerful of the two litigants does not become the judge" — instead of saying that in every case the public in Britain and in Europe has been led off to discussion of the merits of that particular dispute which engaged their attention at the time. Thus, in 1931 it was argued that perhaps there was a good deal to be said for the Japanese case, that the Chinese had been provocative, or in the Italian-Abyssinian matter that Abyssinians were after all a very savage people; or that in the case of Spain the government had been guilty of ferocities. All this was really irrelevant to the main issue of European civilization. The real point was that the exercise of violence by the stronger party to the dispute should if possible be prevented by the intervention of the Community of Nations protecting the weaker against the stronger. It is impossible of course to separate the European from the Far Eastern issue. Peace is indivisible. If Britain had been disposed to furnish economic aid to China in her resistance to Japan in 1931, the former would have had the help of the United States. We would

have had, therefore, the forces distributed in this way: On the one side Japan and on the other Britain, most of the British Empire, the United States, China, Russia. If it had been clear that these had been ready to stand by the law against violence, even only to the extent of economic, political, and diplomatic assistance, it is extremely questionable whether that law would in fact have been challenged. And if the law had triumphed in that case it would not have been challenged in the later cases of Abyssinia and Spain.

But Britain at that time, instead of showing feeling for the law, showed among many sections of its people a strong feeling for the violator of the law, for Japan; a large part of the British press was pro-Japanese, and the lead so given was followed by large sections of English society.

It is clear from the behaviour of every nation in the world now engaged in re-armament, that it is not prepared to surrender the use of arms for defence. In that case either defence must come by using such arms as do exist, and as long as they exist, for the defence of the law, the law against violence in the way described, or civilization will perish, and we shall drift once more to a Dark Age. If that happens it will be because the instinct of self-preservation has been expressed *unintelligently,* as certain animals, that have become extinct, gave expression to that instinct; because the animal has overridden the human, because blind instinct has overridden the seeing mind.

NORMAN ANGELL

Human beings are creatures who, in so far as they are animals and persons, tend to regard themselves as independent existents, connected at most by purely biological ties, but who, in so far as they rise above animality and personality, are able to perceive that they are interrelated parts of physical and spiritual wholes incomparably greater than themselves. For such beings the fundamental moral commandment is: You shall realize your unity with all being. ... Love, compassion and understanding or intelligence — these are the primary virtues in the ethical system ... . Ultimate reality is impersonal and non-ethical; but if we would realize our true relations with ultimate reality and our fellow-beings, we must practise morality and (since no personality can learn to transcend itself unless it is reasonably free from external compulsion) respect the personality of others.

—ALDOUS HUXLEY

BRIAN G. COOPER

The Czech Experience

[Mr. Brian G. Cooper is well known to our readers. In the last five years he has visited Czechoslovakia four times, lectured at Bratislava University, and taken part in discussions at the Comenius Theological Faculty in Prague. He is also in regular correspondence with a number of Czech academics and religious leaders. On the basis of his knowledge of the situation, and his considerable acquaintance with the general climate of religion and thought in Eastern Europe, he gives us an interesting account of the mental and cultural response of the Czech to the 1968 crisis. His account is tinged with personal feeling but is not in any way partisan or merely political. The response of the Czech that he describes gives much food for thought and arouses admiration.—ED.]

THE Czechoslovakia events of 1968, the developments which preceded them and their continued outworking down to today, have been voluminously analysed from many angles — political, economic, sociological, strategic, diplomatic. Certainly the whole experiment of Alexander Dubcek towards "Socialism with a human face," the consequent Russian reaction culminating in invasion, the non-military resistance offered by the Czech people, and the unfolding of a subsequently long drama of action, reaction, struggle, and compromise contain all those many implications. Yet, personally, knowing the country and its people from four visits, many friends, and not a little study, I cannot see those extraordinary and deeply significant events only in such dry and mundane terms. I believe that no term other than "spiritual" can properly describe the experiences and qualities revealed in Czechoslovakia 1968.

I do not use the word "spiritual" in any narrow religious sense, but in the broadest context of human experience in depth, only fully to be explained in terms beyond the materialistic.

In the early months of 1968, in several stages of peaceful revolution and following profound discontent manifested by students and intellectuals, the conservative Communist government of Antonin Novotny was replaced by the reformist-liberal Communist government of Dubcek, First Secretary of the Czech Communist Party, and President Svoboda. The spring and summer of 1968 saw quite remarkable developments in a country previously regarded as rock-solid for traditional-style Communism. The Communist Party's *Action Programme* carefully examined every aspect of society, proposed countless reforms to abandon every vestige of a totalitarian state, and embarked upon sweeping changes to forge a new kind of Communism, both truly Marxist and truly democratic, fully Socialist and fully free. It was an intoxicating time, as I saw for myself,

staying in Prague during that summer. In cafés and at street-corners, people eagerly discussed the latest developments. Many individuals and groups published manifestos. Modern arts flourished, as young painters and poets took to the streets of Prague to display their creations and read their verses. A great national debate took place as newspapers, radio, and television, free alike from the dead hand of party censorship and untrammelled by Western advertising pressures, tasted and rejoiced in a liberty rarely paralleled in any other modern state. Every facet of the nature of man in society was discussed from many angles; many possibilities for "the good society" were proposed; the whole structure of human relationships came under searching scrutiny. All this went much beyond the Communist Party's proposals, sweeping though the latter were; indeed, few of the changes set forth by Dubcek and his followers had not been either carrried out, or discussed, in other Communist countries. The Czech economy, stagnant for the previous three years, was to be revitalized by decentralization of economic planning and the widespread use of profitability as an index of efficiency. The cumbersome party machine and overloaded bureaucracy had to be pruned. Freedom to travel to the West was very widely granted. The Slovaks, historically a separate nation from the Czechs of Bohemia and Moravia, were accorded greater autonomy.

Other aspects of the *Action Programme* were more far-reaching, going to the very core of human freedom. Censorship of news and comment disappeared. The trials of citizens persecuted for their beliefs in the Stalinist era were reopened; a process of rehabilitation was begun. The possibility of "opposition" political parties was openly talked of; non-Communist political discussion clubs came into being. The monolithic state youth organization was broken down into a variety of specialist groups for children, teenagers, and students. And throughout this whole process, debate never ceased to rage — whether on television or screen, or through the columns of such publications as *Rude Pravo, Literarni Listy,* and *Reporter.* The whole method, style, speed, flavour, and process of this vast national discussion, inter-reacting constantly with the decisions of the political leaders, who themselves were at the very heart of the whole process, were utterly novel in the Communist world, and largely without precedent in modern human experience.

It went beyond the political to become a spiritual experience, for the Czechs deeply questioned themselves about the meaning of their past, and about their recent past — the occupation by the Nazis in 1938, the suffering of the war years, the Liberation, the 1948 Revolution, the dark Stalinist years, and the time of stagnation under Novotny. Some said the Communist Party had forfeited all moral right to rule; others, that

the ability of the Communists to transform themselves from within was a vindication. Those who had been imprisoned searched for a true Marxism their erstwhile captors had betrayed; those holding posts of responsibility in former dark days often admitted their guilt, voluntarily resigning office and privilege to come to terms with the demand of newly-awakened conscience. Communists who had been corrupted by their monopoly of power were to be found asking Christians for help and forgiveness. People who had secretly opposed Communism all their lives suddenly felt so drawn by the sincerity and honesty of men like Dubcek that they rushed to join the party and serve their nation through it. There was a dark side, too, as is usually the case in a time of catharsis: some conservative Communists were driven to suicide, others to flee their homes; personal vendettas were waged; even racialism occasionally raised its hydra-head. The dimension of a demonic spirituality was, tragically, not altogether absent from Czechoslovakia 1968.

Yet, above all, it was a time of spiritual awakening. "To be asleep for a long time, and then to come fully awake, suddenly, is a marvellous experience," a Czech student who had been active in the anti-Novotny and anti-Russia protest actions remarked to me. To awaken to the possibility of a new kind of freedom, one not merely political but deeply psychological, in which a new liberty from the guilts and fears of the past mixed intoxicatingly with a sense of radical openness towards the future, was a profoundly moving experience for many Czechs in 1968. Suddenly, all possibilities seemed open; men and women felt young again; traditional categories of thinking went into the melting-point of spontaneity. I know Marxist scholars in Prague who searched the New Testament for truth from Christianity to illuminate the new context of living. I know Czech theologians who re-read Marx to re-discover, or more often know for the first time, the purity of Communist thought unsullied by Stalinist distortions. The very style of Dubcek's government fleetingly caught a new spiritual dimension in the political life of man. In our day, technological revolution, mass education, and the communications explosion demand and make feasible an altogether new dimension of popular participation in the process of government of modern societies, and a new political style, more open, democratic, flexible, and responsible than hitherto. As Professor Julius Tomin, of the Faculty of Philosophy at the Charles University in Prague, said of the pre–August-1968 months,

> Czechoslovakia today is an example of a quest for a new political style, with a high degree of public awareness and public participation, and in that sense approximating to Marcuse's "unrepressive society."

Similarly, the *Action Programme,* describing the difference between

Western democracy and the Czech experiment, termed the latter "a higher degree of democratic freedom ... aiming at the full self-realization of each and every one." Both for Czechoslovakia itself, and in the context of the whole world in 1968, witnessing a moral struggle wherein Martin Luther King was martyred and barricades went up in Paris and many other places, the spiritual dimension within the political turbulence was deeply significant. Men were struggling to know the truth of themselves, their possibilities, their past and their future.

The spiritual dimension in Czechoslovakia's 1968 experience was most fully and dramatically manifest in the days during and immediately following the Russian invasion, when the Czech resistance, with only a few exceptions, was non-military and non-violent. The forms of resistance, though not without precedent, were certainly astonishing: people argued with soldiers and their officers, students sat down in front of tanks, country-folk formed "human chains" forcing armoured columns to reverse, and in a thousand-and-one ingenious ways massive non-co-operation was demonstrated towards the invader. Gandhi, Martin Luther King, and Luthuli were obvious precedents, of course, for many of these techniques, but much was new. Never before had an invading army of overwhelming strength been rendered so impotent and demoralized so rapidly by an unwelcoming population. For the Russians, the absence of the expected welcome was doubly humiliating, because in 1945 they had been applauded as the liberators from the Nazi yoke.

> In 1945 we welcomed you with wine and with flowers. Today you receive neither wine nor flowers, nor even bread and water. Ponder, O comrades, why this is.

That remark, freely spoken to the Russians during August 1968, was quoted to me by Professor Tomin, who summed up the distinctive qualities of the Czech resistance as follows:

> The Czechoslovak resistance was peaceful, in that it was a "word-offensive," verbal and symbolic, rather than a physical attack, and in that it was disciplined. But it was more positive and aggressive than is implied by a term like "non-violence," more total and uninhibited than Gandhi's peaceful resistance in India. In its aggressiveness and unrepressiveness it was violent; yet it was controlled and it was free from physical violence. It was situational rather than pre-programmed. The actions were in large measure spontaneous and showed flexibility and adaptability to varying situations. Sometimes speech was appropriate, sometimes silence, sometimes the dramatic and sustained sounding of sirens and horns. The responses were highly individual and guided by artist's feel rather than by planner's blue-print. It was a remarkable fusion of spontaneity and discipline, of autonomy and centralization, primarily through the effective

nation-wide communicating and unifying power of radio. The power of the resistance lay also in the combination of opposition to the invaders and communication with them, firmness and intransigence towards them, and respect, sympathy, approachability and communicativeness towards them. "We pitied the Russian soldiers enough to be harsh with them." This would not have been possible without the historic bonds between Russians and Czechoslovaks, and the possibility of communication due to compulsory study of Russian in Czech schools for twenty years. Baffling subtlety and unpredictability (including the polite procrastination and the smile of the good soldier Schweik) were important elements in the peaceful resistance. Irony and humour (eminent Czech qualities) were also important in a resistance that was singularly free from sullenness and petulance. The unity of the entire nation behind the Communist Party had been possible only because the Party had voluntarily opened itself to criticism during the previous eight months, so that the bitterness and negative feelings of the people had been externalized and worked through before the invasion.

The August days were tragic days for the Czechs, but also wonderful days. "We did not know we had such qualities in us," a teacher commented. A lightness, a gaiety, a joy prevailed among the people: theirs was a spiritual victory.

Perhaps this can best be understood in the context of the history of the Czech people. Geographically placed in the very heartland of central Europe, having endured many trials and suffered many wars and occupations, Czechs and Slovaks alike have earned a certain nobility of soul, more faithfully manifest in non-military rather than martial fashion. The Czechs especially are rare among European peoples in having few military heroes. In the early 1400s Zizka led the followers of Jan Huss in armed struggle for free religion, and two centuries later Protestant Bohemia again was caught in the vortex of religious war. In our own time, the Slovak National Rising and the Prague "barricades" of 1945 were among the epic stories of World War II. Yet the true Czech character is essentially non-militaristic. Few people have more men of the spirit among their national hero-figures. Martyrs, religious leaders, artists and men of letters have inspired successive generations to hold their national identity when invading armies have been overwhelmingly arrayed. Jan Huss, Protestant theologian at Prague University and popular preacher at the Bethelem Chapel, went to the stake for liberty of conscience. Chelcicky continued the tradition of Huss, advocating a constructive pacifism generations ahead of his time. In the mid-seventeenth century, when Europe was torn asunder by religious strife, Comenius of Bohemia devoted a lifetime to true Christian reconciliation and enlightened education of the young. The first President of the Czechoslovak Republic, Thomas Masaryk, was a philosopher-statesman, devoting himself patiently and

peacefully to the ideal of Czech nationhood. Nor should the great stream of Czech musicians, such as Dvorak and Smetana, and artists such as the nineteenth-century poet and leader of the literary revival, Jan Kollar, be neglected. Czechoslovakia's long tradition of spiritual resistance when arms could but fail has few parallels on the European canvas. Jan Palach, the young philosophy student who burned himself to death in protest against the Russian occupation and in so doing saved the nation from despair, is the latest example, tragic yet sublime, of that noble line. Dubcek, with his concern to transform a Communism which had become stagnant and over-bureaucratic into a dynamic "Socialism with a human face," made his own distinctive contribution, never to be forgotten.

The spiritual crisis continues in Czechoslovakia, though the country is no longer under the world's spotlight. The struggle to retain integrity amid many necessary compromises makes many moral demands. The younger generation are tempted by the spectre of disillusionment, the older people by an easy apathy: in many hearts and minds the challenge to long-term commitment to democratic socialist ideals is being faced and its demands wrestled with. In this continuing spiritual crisis, the Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches, and the small Orthodox communion too, have special responsibilities. In the Dubcek days the Churches became fully involved in criticizing Communism's past mistakes and debating the meaning of an open, egalitarian society. More recently, Christians in Czechoslovakia have emphasized "the Gospel of hope" to a people drawn to despair. Escapist religion and anti-communist pietism have endangered honest Christian witness. Yet, as Czech Christians meet their Marxist fellow countrymen to discover together the ethical meaning of their common situation, and as Christians in Czechoslovakia and Russia renew their contacts to seek a way of reconciliation for their two nations, that "Gospel of hope" develops meaningfulness.

What began in Czechoslovakia at the outset of 1968 continues to this day, although in changed circumstances. It was, and is, nothing less than the re-assertion of a nation's soul, seeking its spiritual identity in every aspect of life. Because of what we can learn from their experience, as much as out of tribute to a noble people, we should never allow ourselves to forget Czechoslovakia.

BRIAN G. COOPER

P. NAGARAJA RAO

Mysticism, Ritual, and Ethics in Indian Philosophy

[Dr. P. Nagaraja Rao, now retired after a long career as a university teacher of philosophy, has been a frequent contributor to THE ARYAN PATH. In this article he outlines the complementary significances of mysticism, ritual, and ethics in Indian tradition.—ED.]

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY comprehends two groups of systems of philosophy: one, the six systems based on the authority of the Vedas (i.e., Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṁsā, and Vedānta), and the other, the two prophetic religions based on the experiences of Gautama the Buddha and Mahavira, Buddhism and Jainism. All these systems disclose a dual unity, a moral unity and a spiritual unity, in their outlook.

The spiritual unity underlying the systems is the unique and distinguishing characteristic of Indian philosophy as against Western schools of philosophy. The supreme spiritual ideal of all the Indian systems is described as *Mokṣa*. It is the master word in Indian Philosophy. Philosophic quest in India, as a sincere search, arose from the deeply felt need of men to attain a state of existence which is full of bliss and from which there is no return to the world of *saṁsāra* (births and deaths), a state in which all doubts and disbeliefs are dispelled and all tensions and strife overcome. The need to attain such a state and the supreme desirability of its pursuit arise from the experience of the threefold suffering to which man on earth is subject in this life. It may be possible to put an end to human suffering, in one or two forms, for the time being; that does not rule out its recurrence. To put a radical end to it necessitates the attainment of *Mokṣa*. Though the systems give different descriptions of *Mokṣa*, they are all agreed in asserting that *Mokṣa* is the ideal and the destiny of man.

Mokṣa is a gospel of joy and a pragmatic quest for a radical remedy for all the ills of human life. Hence, Indian philosophy is described as practical and has a religious ideal. It is not an intellectual exercise, an attempt to satisfy our curiosity or to frame an ideal pattern. Philosophy aims at "what matters most to human life." Religious experience intuits and discovers the great truths of Reality, and philosophy demonstrates to reason the nature of the truths and the pattern of their existence. Every system in Indian philosophy is at its core a "cluster of insights" intuited first by the seers and subsequently explained in the light of reasoning. Hence they are all called *darśanas*.

The intuition of the primal truths is an experience *sui generis*. It is labelled differently and described variously. It is called *Brahmānubhava*,

aparokṣānubhūti, Nirvāṇa, kaivalya. In the language of the philosophy of religion the experience is called mysticism. In this sense, mysticism is the foundation for all the systems of Indian philosophy, not excluding Buddhism and Jainism. There is an amazing agreement among the systems on the affirmation that mystic experience is trans-intellectual and is not the result of discursive reasoning; and further that the experience cannot be *exhaustively* explained in terms of human concepts. Human language can at best indicate what it is and not describe it fully. Such experience is the expression not of any one faculty of man, e.g., thinking, feeling, or willing; it is an integral experience. It is *samyag-darśana.* It is a total transforming experience. It brings about the absence of pain, sorrow, or any longing. There is no torment of any wish or the apprehension of any disappointment. It is a peace that passeth all understanding. It is not an emotional experience; it is certainly not reverie or day-dream or hallucination or illusion, or like any drug-induced or other psychic state.

Mysticism is an integral experience which is a *bona-fide* way of knowing trans-empirical categories. It is a direct vision of Reality. It is latent in all religion. It gives immediate experience and removes doubt by its self-evidence. It is soul-sight that is operative in mysticism and not retinal sight. It is not instinct-knowledge as found in animals. It is more akin to creative insight, supra-rational. It is, in the words of Dr. Radhakrishnan, "wisdom translucent." The view that the supreme spiritual ideal is one that has to be experienced by the total man, is common to all mysticism, East and West. The experience is described as a rebirth: *dvitīya janma,* a second birth. It is a birth in the spirit. Among the mystics of all lands there is a striking unanimity. They shake hands across continents. They do not belong to this land or that nation: they are world men, *viśva-mānavas.* It is mystic experience that makes religion experimental and non-dogmatic. Mystic experience is the actualization of all the potential capacities of man. It is a cure for the ache which the finite soul feels in its desire to expand into infinite consciousness.

All the systems of Indian philosophy agree that there is an alien element that stands in the way of the finite man realizing his true nature. This *alien* element is described by some as *maya*; by others as *karma* or *ahaṁkāra,* or *tamas,* or lower nature. The only distinction that we can draw about the nature of this obstacle in the way of man's realization is, that some — indeed, many — regard the obstacle as real, and the Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara alone regards it as non-real. (The Advaita view implies that the obstacle is objective and existent, but not eternal.) It is to be destroyed by the experience generated by the *mahāvākyas,* the "great utterances" of spiritual traditions.

From this it follows that all the systems have of necessity to outline

a scheme of *sādhanā* (spiritual discipline) to attain the experience, by removing the obstacles, *Sādhanā* is the complex of efforts to attain the goal by pressing into service the possible human resources. The common insistence on the need for intense *sādhanā* to attain *Mokṣa* is the second unity disclosed by the systems of Indian philosophy.

Sādhanā, in Indian philosophy, has two aspects: ceremonial purity and ethical excellence. Unregenerate man has to change his ways of life and habits of mind, regulating them by the master-sentiment, *Dharma,* and harness them to yield a healthy pattern of life. In this effort rituals occupy an important place. Every religion has a scheme of rituals and Hinduism is no exception. We get our religion and the knowledge of its tenets concretely in the form of rituals. They are the husk within which the seed of religion grows. A ritual represents some aspect of religious faith. The ritual of pilgrimage (*Yātrā* to *divya deśas*), undertaken all over India, conjures up in the mind of a pilgrim various associations and makes him conscious of the rich culture he is heir to. The rituals are in essence symbols and they visualize for us belief in things spiritual and eternal.

Man needs symbols. Language itself is symbolism. Most normal rituals are intended to cleanse the mind and dust the window-panes of the senses, whose condition prevents us from seeing clearly and correctly. Our unclean habits, bad thoughts, and unethical emotions cloud our vision. We have to secure purity of mind and heart. The ritual we perform provide for us excellent lessons in self-control. They can be the first steps in the long pilgrimage towards the liberation of the spirit from the domain of flesh.

Rituals in the history of civilization have closely allied themselves with art, and have discharged an aesthetic function also. But the all-important central function of ritual is to make us experience the religious emotion, what Otto calls the "numinous." This it does in many ways by inducing in us the necessary receptive mood and pre-disposing the mind to the religious perspective. It does so by creating symbols and consecrated images, by giving us sacred formulae in an ancient language whose utterance thrills us though we comprehend its meaning only dimly. The vessels, lamps, rosaries, *mantras,* music, etc., have all their cumulative effect in preparing our mind.

The great sage Vyāsa, while describing the life of the Pāṇḍavas in the forest, speaks of pilgrimage as the poor man's *yajña*: Gandhiji writes in his *Hind Swaraj* of how many of our great men travelled throughout India either on foot or in a bullock-cart. They learnt one another's languages and there was no aloofness between them. What could have been the intention of those far-seeing ancestors of ours who established *Setu-*

bandha (Rameshwara) in the South, Jagannath in the East, and Haridwar in the North as places of pilgrimage? They were no fools. They knew that worship of God could have been performed just as well at home. They taught us that hearts aglow with righteousness had the Ganga in their own homes. But they saw that India was one undivided land, so made by nature. Hence they established holy places in various parts of India, and fired the people with an idea of oneness. All these indicate the important place ritual occupies in the life of the Hindu. The later development of Buddhism in its Mahāyāna version has also introduced rituals and prescribed devotions to Buddha.

Rituals will continue as long as we need symbols to represent what cannot be comprehended. The difficulty about ritual is that it must not be allowed to narrow down our vision of reality and make us take the symbol for that which is symbolized. Ritual must not be performed in a lifeless mechanical form; for such an attitude tends to dissolve our faith. The ritual must be made to be expressive of our true faith. It is here our priesthood is found wanting. We need to educate it. Further, ritual must also admit of change to express our growing faith. We need to reform it from time to time.

The schools of Indian philosophy are one in upholding the need for ethical virtues as the absolute precondition for obtaining *Mokṣa*. There is no possibility of a godly life without a good life. We can never bypass ethics. Professor D. S. Sarma has put it thus: "Religion is the temple and morality is its high gateway which we call the *gopuram*. You should enter the temple like a true worshipper through the *gopuram* and not like a thief by jumping over the wall." If we try to be religious without being moral, we shall be only practising self-deception. The Upaniṣads and the *Gītā* insist on moral excellence as absolutely necessary for achieving a godly life. The art of life consists in living within the framework of *Dharma*. The wealth which we acquire to gratify our desires, *kāma*, must be governed by canons of morality. The poets, the contemplative saints, and the seers all insist on the necessity of moral life. It has a double effect. It enables us to build a happy society that is just and good; and it enables us to cleanse our mind of all impurities. We cannot be religious in observing rituals and continue to be "consistently treacherous, completely selfish, deliberately cruel and entirely unrepentent." If we do, our religion will be a sham.

The *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* declares: "*nāvirato duścaritān nāśānto nāsamāhitaḥ; nāśāntamanaso vāpi prajñānenainam āpnuyāt*" (not he who has not desisted from evil ways; not he who is not tranquil; not he who has not a concentrated mind; not even he whose mind is not composed can reach this [Self] through right knowledge) (I.ii.23). Morality is accorded

the first place in *sādhanā*. It is the first *Dharma*. *Ācāraḥ prathamo dharmaḥ*. Sage Vasiṣṭha states in his *Dharmaśāstra* that the Vedas do not purify one who is bereft of morality (*ācārahīnam na punanti vedāḥ*) (VI.3). Pārāśara holds the view that for all the four classes sound moral life is the governor, and *Dharma* turns away from those that are wanting in good conduct:

> *ācārabhraṣṭa-dehānām bhaved dharmaḥ parāṅmukhaḥ*
> *caturṇām api varṇānām ācāro dharmapālakaḥ.*

The author of the *Gītā* at every step insists on the practice of morality and self-control as necessary for achieving spiritual experience. He calls is *ātmasaṅyama yoga*, i.e., the integration of the self by establishing self-restraint. He also insists on the practice of compassion, charity, sympathy, and good will to all. He declares that the Yogi should regard others' welfare and good as his own. The words used are: *atmaupamyena sarvatra samam paśyati* (VI.32). This means that one should desire the good of all, as he desires his own good. Śaṅkara in his comment on the words draws pointed attention to the meaning that we should do unto others as we would wish to be done unto us. We are asked to treat mankind in our person or in others' (in the language of Kant) as an end, never as a means. This admonition spells the end of all exploitation and restores justice to all. The mystic experience, so gloriously described in all the systems, may transcend morality and logic, but never bypasses them. It is more than morality; it transcends reason; but it is never infra-rational or sub-moral. In Indian tradition, ritual and ethics are the necessary indispensable means to mystical and to the final spiritual experience.

P. NAGARAJA RAO

The Tree Cut Down

It stood in a velvet pool of silence apart from the other trees. The lover, the poet, and the dreamer found comfort at its breast and peace filtered through its long green fingers upon the heads of the weary. Old men slept like tired babes beneath it; the blackbird's song was cradled in its boughs; and children's laughter silvered the silence of its solitude. It drank deeply of life. It knew the joy of the lover, the grief of the mourner, the ecstasy of the poet, and the loneliness of the outcast. It remained serene and undisturbed although it imbibed something of all the passions of humanity.

Today they have cut it down, yet the essential part of it will remain for ever. The spot where it once stood will be hallowed by a fragrance as delicate as violets, an understanding mellowed by time, a cool green sympathy for all who may seek it.

HERBERT BLUEN

ALUN LLEWELLYN

Echoes from the Spheres

[Mr. Alun Llewellyn has become well known to our readers by his many articles in the last few years which treat of the wisdom contained in the Ancient Books of Wales. In this article he combines as usual an explanation of their astronomy-based philosophy with translations of pieces from these ancient texts.—ED.]

THE ANCIENT BOOKS OF WALES, from which stemmed the great theme of the Arthurian legend, are a unique combination of practical observation of the courses of the heavenly bodies and of the poetic philosophy it inspired. It is in the *Chronicles of Nennius* that the first mention of the legendary Arthur is made; and that history of affairs in Britain, belonging as it does in its corrupted form to the ninth century A.D., refers these writings to a date in the early part of the sixth. To be more exact, it uses the phrase that then they *"claruerunt"* or were made plain, a phrase which implies that some previous body of knowledge was reduced to order or committed to writing.

Much of their matter relates to the study of Time as recorded on the sun-dial, to the relationship of the position of the sun at noon (the meridian), to the point of due north as marked by the Pole Star; the swing of the sun from its due west and due east stations at the equinoxes to its angles recorded at winter and summer solstices. These, among other subjects of study, were essential for purposes of navigation; and it is of great interest that terms such as CATH, for the sun at noon, or due south, repeat those used by Etruscan science (CATHA) for the same phenomena and that the earliest forms of Latin words, e.g., LUC-NA (for *luna*) and LUC-MEN (for *lumen*), themselves possibly of Etruscan origin, are similarly represented. It argues that in sub-Roman Britain contact continued with the skills of Roman seamanship derived from an even older Mediterranean tradition.

The philosophy developed on this basis was distinctively Pythagorean in nature; this is by no means surprising since the philosophy of numbers was one calculated to recommend itself to practical navigators for whom the reduction of time and space, the correlation of hours and the movements of heavenly bodies, to a common denominator was essential. But it is a Pythagorean school of thought deriving from Heraclitus and Plato and aware of Aristotle; the "invasion" of Britain by learned astronomers immediately after the Claudian conquest recorded by Plutarch, and the influx of scholars into the country, seeking refuge from the troubled Continent in the fifth century, had a late and lonely flowering.

One set of instructional lines (*Black Book,* Fol. 4) is typical in its movement from studious exposition of the theme into a lyric conclusion.

Aedehoglho (The World in the Sphere of Eternal Time)

Think of Earth:
It was born from the system of Sun and sphered by it
as the Sun's system itself was formed by the concentration
of the First Movement in Creation (the *Primum Mobile*)
Earth's structural limits were laid down by the Sphere of Planets
and the work of its scheme of Light owes its laws
to the ordered restriction imposed on itself
by that First Cause, primal impulse of all things.
Creation, defining that eternal pulse,
set firm the order of Earth's coherent globe
by first shaping the confines and united motion of the Firmament
which then shook free the Planets from itself.
Earth is the inmost formation of the structure of Fixed Stars
whose circuit surrounds the light of the Sun, the Moon, the Planets.
Earth is a construction within that solar system.
The working of the visible hemisphere of the World
is patterned in the scheme of the living Cosmos
within the shell of outer space beyond the stars,
and in turn conceived from itself the substance of Earth.

> The formed firmament bound the girdle of planets
> and clasped the golden ring of the sun round earth;
> the formed procession of the stars of evening
> studded the pattern of hours with living light,
> catching the blind motion of light's first impulse
> in the wheeled network of symmetric spheres:
> the stars of earth lighting the world's way,
> the stars of sky swung on the shield of night,
> the formed bowl of day turning in rhythm,
> the formed circlet of planets answering its rhyme,
> the numbered cycle of hours in their set degrees,
> these are the shapes of the force that minutes the pulse of eternity,
> the first force that is the last of all things.

A further poem, properly so called, from the *Book of Taliesin* (Fol. 17) is even more striking. Like so many of these ancient pieces, its meaning was deeply confused in the Middle Ages when the science it expressed was more than suspect and the vocabulary it had developed was thought of as belonging to the Black Arts.

It would be difficult to find a better description of that vocabulary than the one given to the work of the Ionian philosophers of early Greece,

who, as it now seems, were similarly engaged in re-creating the coherent knowledge of a shattered civilization: phrases built up from short, monosyllabic nouns. It is possible to use this form of construction as vehicle for a poetic metalipsis and convey parallel meanings within the same word. "*Neu Ui Luossauc*" makes use of this method to convey the Pythagorean simile of the World constructed upon the harmony of the seven planets as the octave of music contains the seven intervals between the eight dominant notes of the scale.

So lies the Earth under the starred line of night,
held in the wide wheel that bears the sun
and the set series of planets on its rim.
So lies the Earth in the turned bowl of skies,
an inner boundary for the galaxy,
a centred station for the circles of the Universe.
So lies the Earth in the network of the Cosmos
swayed by its logic of numbered light.
So lies the Earth, child of the moving soul of Creation,
the form of Being set between man and his heavens.
Where the roundel sun marks the metre of the years
in the measured rhythm of the stars' space,
Earth, held in the clasp of the Firmament,
answers its strung pulse with the tremor of days.
Under the nine-wreathed contours of the domed night,
Earth lies in the chorus of the stars' congregation
in the lawed line of their movement,
in the balanced rotation of their light,
bound by that lawed line,
conceived in the focus of that turning;
a vessel fashioned on the wheel of endless time.
Earth lies, the inner concentration of eternity,
a living pattern structured by the compassed sun,
Time's consummate involution
designed by night and by the stars;
Creation's last travail,
the living substance of formed light.

The sphere of Earth in the sphere of stars
bears its own note in the octave sky
where day sings through its double bars
and the planets quarter their harmony
and sea and sun and the poised Pole
make counterpoint in their trio'd whole.
Like a song sung, like a harp strung,
Like pipe to lip, like viol to bow,
star and sea and shore and sky

number their notes in arpeggio
through the scheme of scales in the key of light
that staves the planets through the night.

It is characteristic that a prose-sentence is interlined at this point: The Seven Sectors (*Seith Ugeint*) of the Firmament sphering Earth (i.e., the Planets) in the circuit round Ocean set by the Sun, shape the course of Time in a living cycle of ordered light over Earth. The word UGEINT is basically the sphering of the heaven of land and sea by Creation; it has survived with the meaning of "twenty." The 180 degrees of the upper hemisphere are described in "*Pagur Yuuy Porthaur*" (*Black Book.* Fol. 47b) as *nau ugein* or 9×20. And in the poem under discussion the Aristotelian count of 9 is accepted for the spheres of the Universe. This was the result of sub-dividing the 5 major spheres with the circuits of the seven planets held in the sphere of the Sun. The Sun was already included among the 5; Mercury was identified with the edge of Ocean and Saturn with the edge of the Firmament, which therefore left only 4 to be added to the count.

NAU means, literally, the formed emergence of the system of the Sun; it has survived with the precise meaning of "nine." It must be added that to distinguish it as having its own separate Heaven, NAUT was the form the word took. The concept of its sphering was written as CNAUT; its final form in the Neo-Cosmos was GNAUT. Both have survived with the sense of human flesh and human nature. The poem uses NEU for Earth as part of the related theme; for the outermost sphere of Night and Eternity, the form is NOU which, as a living thing, becomes NOUS. This originating sphere for all things, the Platonic *On,* to which the Ancient Books give the name NO as part of the Neo-Cosmos, when sphered and determined is written GNO. It seems less probable that the originators of this vocabulary used their dexterity to elaborate parallels to the terms of classical philosophy than that they were aware of long-established terms of navigational reference from which that philosophy had risen. The direct relationship between the Intelligence of Creation and the human spirit, they consistently maintain.

Many passages are devoted in each of the collections to a study of the distinct functions attributed to the seven planetary spheres individually. The most striking are contained in the *Book of Aneirin* ("*Dyfforthes,*" 17. xiii and "*Ni Fforthint,*" 35. xii). The latter repeats the former phrase by phrase but with a spelling and use of terms showing clearly that it belongs to a much later date in the growth of the language.

Ocean, made finite by the fashioned heaven of Night,
moves around Earth in the limits set by Creation,

its skies shaped under the stars aligned in darkness.
Ocean is structured beneath the fires of Sun
whose zone of being rose compacted
to gather Earth into design.
So Mars, the central circuit among the planets,
the planets born from the doming of the Firmament,
sets over Earth the curved rim of the World;
Mercury with its banded movement marks
the perimeter of land and sea against the Night;
Jupiter's motion from among the stars
links the World around Earth with the Eternity which conceived it.
Venus encircles Earth with the roll of years;
Saturn, arched among the constellations,
holds Earth fast in the ring of time's reckoning.
The Sun surrounds Sea with its ordered hours
that are the issue of the turning Firmament.
The Moon is the level measure of the working World
within the closure of the stars.
So Earth is formed as the traverse of the Sun
and of its kindred planets
where the hours are woven together;
the sphere of Sun where the pulse of Creation,
conceiving Earth, moves companied in the circle of Time.
Such is the World that plans Earth and Ocean
as a living unity within the unity of circled stars
that Night gathers together.

For each of these planets, the word DIU, or inner division, is used. They were intimate to Man; and the word retains the connection expressed in the oldest forms of Latin between what was Divine (*Diu-us*), the structure of Day (*Diu-es*) and the Divisions of time (*Diu-is*). Jupiter was held to be the first of the Planets to begin the shaping of Earth within the World and is therefore given a name to describe Earth's origin (Y-EU). Saturn, still seated among the stars, is given that exact description (SAD-URN). Mars, as the inner point of the World's emergent heaven (MAURTH); Mercury as the border of Ocean's rim (MERCH-YR); Venus as the vital spirit of Ocean (GUEN-ER); the Sun as the star aligned to the Firmament by the focus of its meridian upon the Pole (SUL); the Moon as Measurer of the stars (LLUN) all keep, while the shape of their names is reduced to the strict requirements of the vocabulary, a close similarity to the forms familiar in Latin and perhaps suggest their genuine origin.

Venus, "leader" of the sun from west to east through the year, is the subject of a specialized group of poems, all of great literary skill, which insist not only on its unique parabolic course in the skies but celebrate it as the Star of the Sea (*Stella Maris*) and the principle of hope and

love, in close imitation of the invocation with which Lucretius opens his *De Rerum Natura*. But among all the essays which describe the working and the wonder of the spheres of the World, the reference to the Serpent (SARFF and SARPH) seems to reach to symbols of thought already old when the classical world was young. It is a serpent of the Stars and is meant to describe the long spiral of inspiration coiling from the Night through the successive spheres of Creation to end at last in the intelligence of Man. *"Teithi Et Mygant"* (*Aneirin*, 5. xvii) makes this reference in discussing the schematic division of Time shown in the three equal sectors of eight hours each made by the line of the meridian dividing Midsummer Day at Noon and leaving Midsummer Night in its separate confine.

> The skies of Earth set in skies of Sea
> sever the days timed light in three,
> dividing Creation's five-linked ring
> where planets under the star-roof sing
> with the triple sectors that shape the days
> shadowed by sunlight's marching rays.
> Three divisions traced from the stars
> That hold the seas in their golden bars;
> three divisions framed by the World,
> fettered in space, by which Earth is earled;
> three divisions which shore and sea
> take from Creation's empery,
> the gathered system whose sphere fired
> the Sun in its course and Earth inspired;
> three divisions of ordered Light
> that woke the World from the womb of Night;
> three divisions that set men's fate
> under God's heavens' sovereign state.
> Inner sections of Time's sphere
> that number the skies from year to year
> marking the circuit of the sea
> with the cycle of shaped Eternity;
> inner divisions of endless Time
> God made for man in Creation's prime
> to bind them in the chain of hours
> to the timeless dark when Knowledge flowers,
> where, coiling in the wake of Mars,
> the Serpent whispered from the stars.

The intention of this poem, as with many others, is to address itself to practising seamen. The schematic reduction of Time and Space to a common system on which it is based was also basic to Plato's analysis of

the structure of the Universe in the *Timaeus*. But it appeals directly to that intimate association between men and the constellations which, in Western culture, has given the *nave* of a Church and the science of *navigation* a common etymology.

ALUN LLEWELLYN

The Eternal Traveller

Away, away the wilder valleys lie,
And I,
Though I have never been,
Have seen
My foot-trails
Tangled in the dust of silent vales.

Away, beyond to wilder valleys still,
And on they go.
Here they paused
Confused?
Or lost in wonderment?
Who knows?
But on they go, and on and ever on
Those marks I made
Not yesterday,
But long before my yesterdays began.

WINSTON R. COOPER

H. C. DUFFIN

Beauty into Happiness at Rylstone

[Mr. H. C. Duffin, author of *Amphibion,* a study of Robert Browning, and of *Thomas Hardy* and other critical works, is a well-known writer who has contributed many impressive articles to THE ARYAN PATH. In this article he turns again to Wordsworth (on whom he wrote in January 1969 and in March 1962). The article forms an interesting elucidation of Wordsworth's conception of the spiritual value of beauty and innocence, as it is expressed in a poem seldom commented on.—ED.]

MAN has a reasonable claim to be the peak of creation, but his ascent through the apes rules out the possibility of his being what Hamlet rhapsodically called the beauty of the world. The human form must be idealized if it is to rival the beauty of a silver birch or even of the domestic cat. The infinite grace of the greater cats is marred by its association with rapine and cruelty, and to find an equal beauty of form with an inward disposition of innocence one turns to the deer tribes, which reach their pinnacle, in outward and inward aspects, in the doe. And if the doe should happen to be a white doe the dream of utter beauty is realized. That Wordsworth was in no doubt about this may be judged by the very movement of the verse as he tells how—

> Comes gliding in with lovely gleam, ...
> Soft and silent as a dream,
> A solitary Doe!
> White she is as lily of June
> And beauteous as the silver moon ...

But beauty, wherever found, is an objective thing, and only becomes or results in a living spiritual essence when it has passed through the eye to the soul of the beholder. Wordsworth's purpose in writing "The White Doe of Rylstone" was to show this process at work — beauty becoming happiness — in the soul of Emily. He told Mr. Justice Coleridge that he considered this poem as, in conception, the greatest work he had ever produced, that conception being "the true action of the poem," "the perfect purifying and spiritualizing of the intellectual nature" — or, as I have said, the restoration of happiness to the soul of Emily.

For the carrying out of his purpose Emily's soul had first to be reduced to a condition of complete *un*happiness, and it was the function of the story of the rising and of the Nortons' part in it to demonstrate this. The narrative is, as Lamb and Coleridge saw, not attractively presented (hence Wordsworth's insistence on the conception and the "true action") and most readers have been so exhausted by its *langueurs* as to be incapable

of appreciating the significance of the final canto.

For the story part of his poem Wordsworth combined three elements. The narrative basis, the story of the abortive rebellion of the northern earls in 1569 against Elizabeth's Protestant innovations, he took from one of the Percy Ballads called "The Rising of the North." It is not one of the best, but has the right ballad virtue of succinctness, a virtue that Wordsworth quite neglected to take over. The first six cantos of "The White Doe" tell of the setting forth of "old" Norton with eight of his sons, the gathering of the troops of Percy and Neville, the retreat before the mere news of the royal dispositions, the massacre of the Nortons, and the murder of Francis.

But Wordsworth had no intention of merely relating a tale of wasted effort and unnecessary slaughter; out of evil must come a balancing good. The tale as it stood in the Percy ballad was one of unmitigated suffering and loss, so he invented and introduced the figure of Emily, daughter of the Norton, of whom the ballad makes no mention and who does not appear in the family records. She, like her eldest brother Francis, has been brought up by their mother to keep the flame of the Protestant faith alight, against which her father and the rest of her brothers go out to fight. She is "the consecrated maid," and a Wordsworthian emblem of female grief and disaster: her passivity is not sympathetic to modern ideas, but she is made the vehicle of the poet's message.

We come to the third element in the story, and this did not need to be invented — Wordsworth found it in a legend current in the Durham countryside, of the doe that, centuries since, had been wont to stray across the moors from Rylstone Hall, the residence of the Nortons, every Sunday to rest in the churchyard of Bolton Priory while divine service proceeded. The Doe is the perfect counterpart to Emily and is made a vital element in the salvation of the Maid. Surely there was never so divine a beast, and there are few things in Wordsworth so beautiful as his introduction of the White Doe. The folk are gathering for praise and prayer in the Abbey grounds:

> When soft! — the dusky trees between
> And down the path through the open green
> Where is no living thing to be seen;
> And through yon gateway, where is found ...
> Free entrance to the churchyard ground ...
> Comes gliding in with lovely gleam,
> Comes gliding in serene and slow,
> Soft and silent as a dream,
> A solitary Doe!

Here is something of the subtle movement of the verse of "Christabel"; it continues in control as the Doe wanders among the fallen masonry, until at last:

> Beside the ridge of a grassy grave
> In quietness she lays her down;
> Gentle as a weary wave
> Sinks, when the summer breeze hath died
> Against an anchored vessel's side.

To the onlookers the Doe seems something supernatural — perhaps the spirit of the Lady Aäliza, mother of the boy drowned in Wharf and builder of the Priory — "now laid low,"

> To the grief of her soul that doth come and go,
> In the beautiful form of this innocent Doe.

The Doe, emblem of beauty, becomes the companion of Emily, emblem of loss, and we are to watch the miracle of beauty driving out grief. As Wordsworth admitted, all the material action had ended in catastrophe; now comes the seventh canto with its spiritual triumph.

This is marked with the utmost clarity by the poet. At the opening of the canto Emily is presented as "a joyless human Being" who has been brought

> To the subjection of a holy,
> Though stern and rigorous, melancholy!

The epithet "joyless" is deliberately chosen to mark Wordsworth's sense of the lowest stage — apart from positive evil — to which the human mind can be brought, and part of the joylessness is that Emily's melancholy, natural in her circumstances, is "stern and rigorous." It is astonishing to me that Raleigh, in his exposition of the poem, stopped at this point — a position quite alien to Wordsworth's philosophy. The lesson of the poem, presently made clear, is not joyless endurance under loss, but the assimilation of loss and the rebirth of happiness.

Emily is presently shown as having "wandered, long and far" and as having come to rest beneath a leafless oak, where she is approached by her one-time acquaintance, the White Doe.

> Even to her feet the Creature came,
> And laid its head upon her knee,
> And looked into the Lady's face ... .

The Doe becomes Emily's constant companion, and she learns to read the "endless history that lies/In her silent follower's eyes" till gradually her soul is healed and blest

With a soft spring-day of holy,
Mild, and grateful melancholy; —

the terms of the couplet being deliberately opposed to those of the one quoted earlier. She finds "gladness" and a "deeper peace," and ultimately happiness itself. The word "happy" is used for the first time, and in connection with the Doe. Emily sits by Francis's grave at the Priory

Forlorn but not disconsolate:
And when she from the abyss returned
Of thought, she neither shrunk nor mourned;
Was happy that she lived to greet
Her mute Companion.

A noble soul, led by beauty out of joyless grief to a still happiness of love, a condition of "undisturbed mortality": this is the theme of "The White Doe of Rylstone."

Wordsworth has prepared us for this consummation. The lines prefixed to the poem are most often remembered for their terrific description of "suffering" as "permanent, obscure and dark," "having the nature of infinity." But even Helen Darbishire does not note that the lines go on to say that there are ways out of the darkness, which may ultimately lead to "peace divine," and, though peace is not the whole of happiness, it will, when qualified by the word "divine," give us most of what can reasonably be asked. J. F. Danby (*The Simple Wordsworth,* 1960), who recognizes the importance of the poem, says that at the end Wordsworth merely leaves Emily "strengthened and deepened": he does much more than this — she is transformed, also transfigured.

Beauty with Wordsworth is always something more than beauty of outward form — though it is always inclusive of it — and the beauty of the Doe carries a mystical significance. Like Keats's nightingale the Doe is immortal: the hoary pile of the Priory looks down with a smile that seems to say:

"Thou, thou art not a Child of Time,
But Daughter of the Eternal Prime!"

H. C. DUFFIN

ARTHUR L. HERMAN

Is Modern Science Immoral?

[We print below the second and concluding part of Mr. Arthur L. Herman's thoughtful article.—ED.]

II

(4) IN ITS BELIEF that it was value-neutral or amoral, science passed on to its adherents the doctrine that the scientist could not, *qua* scientist, become involved in the value disciplines, such as religion, politics, and art. This has led to the stereotype of the scientist as a non-religious, apolitical, and unaesthetic worker in the educational-industrial-military vineyards. I think this stereotype is, unfortunately, generally accurate. In adhering to the value-neutral philosophy of his own discipline, the scientist has allowed that philosophy to spill over into his private life as a citizen, lover, parent, and human being. The scientist who says, "I don't want to get mixed up with ... ," can generally fill in the blank with "politics," "Viet Nam," "The poor peoples' march," "desegregation," and other areas charged with values and the demands for personal subjective commitment. This attitude of the scientist in turn flows into and infects the scientific society, the educational-industrial-military nexus, and thus the cool detachment paradigmatic of the scientist becomes the norm for the whole population, the mass society. Science has eradicated man's value orientation; hence it is immoral. It has slain value orientation amongst its own brood of scientists first, and then has passed the attitude on as natural to the cool age, the cool generation. Bertrand Russell strikes a point similar to this one when he says:

> Science in its beginnings was due to men who were in love with the world. They perceived the beauty of the stars and the sea, of the winds and the mountains. Because they loved them their thoughts dwelt upon them, and they wished to understand them more intimately than a mere outward contemplation made possible. ... (They) felt the strange beauty of the world almost like a madness in the blood. They were men of Titanic passionate intellect, and from the intensity of their intellectual passion the whole movement of the modern world has sprung. But step by step, as science has developed, the impulse of love which gave it birth has been increasingly thwarted, while the impulse of power, which was at first a mere camp-follower, has gradually usurped command in virtue of its unforeseen success. The lover of nature has been baffled, the tyrant over nature has been rewarded ...

Russell then states his conclusion to this set of charges:

> Thus science has more and more substituted power-knowledge for love-knowledge, and as this substitution becomes completed science tends more and more to become sadistic. The scientific society of the future as we have been imagining it is one in which the power impulse has completely overwhelmed the impulse of love, and this is the psychological source of the cruelties which it is in danger of exhibiting. (*The Scientific Outlook*, pp. 271–3, *passim*, prophetically published in 1931)

Thus I argue, because science has committed *valucide* and *moralicide* (the destruction of values in general and moral values in particular), science is immoral. We have carried this valucide wherever our civilization has reached, and preached it as scientific. The withering hand of our civilization has left no part of the earth untouched and unturned in its missionizing fervour to scientize, civilize, industrialize, urbanize, and pauperize "unspoiled" cultures. We have created a cultural and moral wasteland in Marks, in Watts, in Saigon, and in Hue, and we call that barren country "civilization." This is why I say science is immoral.

In summary to this first part, then, let me say that because scientists in particular engage in immoral acts, by selling themselves to companies whose products are productive of human suffering, violence, and death; and because science does not ask questions itself about those products and their rightness or wrongness; and because science has deluded itself into believing that its procedures and products are value-free; and finally because science has been the chief instrument in the destruction of man's value-orientation to the universe: for all of these reasons, then, I contend that science is essentially immoral.

But the condition of the scientist is not a lost condition; there are things that scientists can do to mitigate the evils that they find themselves enmeshed in and that they find themselves delivering to the world.

The scientist, the technician, and the engineer must overcome, somehow, the Satanic temptation of modern industry to sell his body, talent, and soul to the highest and most powerful industrial Mephistopheles. The industrial slave market in which the young scientist finds himself thrown is a market which exploits talent, feeds on mindless obedience, and engages in wholesale prostitution of that talent because of that obedience. The first task before us must be to become aware of what the whole situation is like and to be honest in our reactions to it. This task is frightfully important simply because, as Charles Frankel has put it,

> ... in the age-old struggle between the partisans of Power and the partisans of Virtue, we have steadily talked one way and steadily believed another. (*Great Moral Dilemmas*, ed. by R. M. MacIver, p. 16)

If once one can admit that, just possibly, what one is doing or is intending to do might be evil, then the Satanic temptation can be seen for what it is, viz., a question of the form, "What do I have to be promised ($10,000, $20,000, $50,000 or $100,000 a year) in order to close my eyes and let someone else (the State, the company, the American Chemical Society, the United States Congress or the President) do my moral thinking for me?" As I stated in the first part of this paper, one of the neatest dodges to this question is just to maintain incessantly and loudly, "But science is amoral, so a question like this cannot arise for me because I am a scientist."

Once the question, "What does it take to bribe me?" has been asked, and once one has decided to be the moral arbiter of one's own destiny, the next question is "Am I doing anything that is morally wrong? Is the company I work for involved immorally in the affairs of other men? What does my company produce? Are these products truly products that I would wish to see used on me and my family, or used in the name of me and my family? Can I identify with the product to the extent that I hold that it frees men from suffering, evil and hatred? Is it a product calculated to increase human pain or relieve human pain? Is it a useless product?" Chemists from the cosmetics industry will have to wrestle with that last question. Those scientists interested in the dairy industry may have to wrestle with the problem of the lethal effects of milk and dairy products on adults — we may confirm sooner than one could think possible that a glass of milk a day for persons over twenty may be the quicker way to the mortuary; it is already known that milk aggravates acne and skin disorders in many teenagers, and yet there is no warning on milk bottles "Danger: The contents of this carton may be lethal if you are over twenty, and injurious to health if you are under twenty." The organic chemists in the dairy industry, the tobacco industry, the distillery and brewery industry, may all be called upon to face up to their moral commitments some day. One would have to include here also the chemists in the metals industry, foods industry, paper industry, and so on who have polluted our streams and air for a profit; the scientists of the plastic and tin can industries who have made their products ugly and indestructible; the technicians of the soap and detergent industry who have produced an undissolvable washing product that plugs and pollutes our tubs, our sewers, and our rivers.

In addition to these directly harmful products and industries with which scientists contract so willingly and eagerly, there are the useless occupations, those jobs which contribute nothing to the welfare of the society, and which work hardest at merely perpetuating themselves. Thus once a scientist begins asking "Where may I work most significantly and

with dignity?" he would have to consider not only those jobs which are harmful, wasteful, and immoral, but those which wear the mask of usefulness which serves to cover frenetic surface energy: busyness shrouded in a pall of self-importance. Offhand, think of those classically useless industries that employ scientists such as the cosmetic and perfume industry (highly trained chemists working here must surely be out just for the money — and the smell), the mortuary science business (certainly not a science at all but a fabulous business built on the fears and general ignorance of a slumbering and bilkable public (cf. Jessica Mitford's harshly revealing examination of this fraudulent business in her *The American Way of Death* and Marshall McLuhan discussing Clark Metal Grave Vaults that "Keep the body of a loved one dry" even when it's raining in the cemetery, in his classic *The Mechanical Bride*). I am suggesting that these occupations are beneath the consideration and dignity of a highly trained scientist and that one ought to think thrice before throwing in with a perfume company, a casket company, an industry that makes preservatives for corpses, make-up for corpses, tombstones for corpses (a geologist friend of mine makes a great deal of money in the tombstones business but hates every pebble of it), and so on. If these jobs must be filled, and I do not for a minute argue that they should, then let them be filled by non-scientists whose consciences can perhaps afford such labouring at the socially useless.

What I am calling for, of course, is a condition of total awareness on the part of the scientist, his relation to his occupation, and the world that that occupation relates to. Only the totally aware man can be the moral man. Being totally aware means asking moral questions about oneself, one's occupation, one's society, and then answering those questions fearlessly and uncompromisingly. To be totally aware is really to make the way we talk consistent with the way we believe. That, it seems to me, is the only way of making a vocation honest, worth while, exciting, and fruitful. Anything less than that is truly beneath the moral dignity of man.

ARTHUR L. HERMAN

GURDIAL MALLIK

C. F. Andrews

[The late C. F. Andrews was one of that small number of European Christians whose genuine saintliness and love of mankind drew them to serve India at a time when she was suffering from many political and social evils. Our old and dear friend Shri Gurdial Mallik writes from personal knowledge and deep feeling of the character and work of C. F. Andrews — a friend of both Gandhiji and Tagore, whose life was one of unmixed service and that perfect humility which only the pure in heart can achieve.—ED.]

C. F. ANDREWS — C.F.A. — Christ's Faithful Apostle! Thus, in a flash, one morning, during 1919, I summed up the spirit of the Man, as I watched him reacting with his whole being to the tale of woe, narrated to him by one of the worst victims of the repressive régime of the Martial Law promulgated in the Panjab some months earlier. The narrator was a retired military officer. He had never taken part in any political movement. He lived a quiet life in his village, in Gujranwala. He was once compelled, almost at the point of the bayonet, by the Area Commander to bear false evidence against one of the local national leaders. He refused point-blank, pleading, "I am now nearing the grave. It's high time, therefore, that I began to practise truth as best I can, according to my own limited understanding and ability." Of course, this simple honest plea was turned down. Whereupon he was stripped naked down to his feet and given sixteen deep cuts with a whip, till he fell down unconscious. Exposing these scars, which he called his sixteen medals of merit, conferred on him by the benign Government in appreciation of his twenty-five years' service in the army, he said to C. F. Andrews and me (I was then working with Andrews as his assistant in the enquiry he was conducting in the Martial-Law–affected districts), "These scars will tell you much more about my crucifixion than the story I have told you." Tears welled up in his eyes as well as in mine, as he finished his heart-rending account. The emotional upheaval was too much, however, for C. F. Andrews. At once he fell at the feet of the victim and said in a choked voice, "On behalf of the people of my country I seek to atone for the atrocities committed by their representatives in India, and appeal to you to forgive them."

Thereupon the retired military officer raised him and embraced him in his large arms and rejoined (he was a Sikh), "My Prophet, Guru Nanak, has enjoined upon us not to entertain any feelings of animosity against anyone, because God dwells in everyone. I assure you that hereafter I shall look upon you all as dear friends."

Atonement for one's own sins of omission and commission, in some form or other, is every individual's bounden duty. But when he atones also for the sins of others he takes on something of the colour and character of an apostle. Maybe, unconsciously, this was at the back of my mind when I was moved to interpret the initials of Andrews' name, C.F.A., as "Christ's Faithful Apostle."

It is, indeed, in this spirit of atonement that he worked from the beginning to the end of his career in India, from 1904 to 1940, when he passed away. He came out from England as a member of the Cambridge Mission Brotherhood and was appointed to the staff of St. Stephen's College, Delhi. He was thirty-three years old then. Before long he became a beloved friend and counsellor of the students, because he took an active and affectionate part not only in their studies but in their sports as well. He was an excellent coach both in the class-room and on the playground, as he was their companion in the hostels. All this stemmed, it seems, from the silent but sure impact on his mind and heart of what one of his Cambridge Professors had once told him years ago. On this Professor's study-table there used to be a paper-weight on which was engraved a short phrase in Latin or Greek. One day Charles Andrews asked him what it meant. The Professor answered, "It means, 'What more have you done?'" and then went to explain that the question embodied a very vital attribute and aspect of Love. It implied the spirit of the second mile, so to speak. For had not Christ told his disciples, nineteen hundred years ago, that if they were asked by a heavily-burdened person to carry his weight over a mile, that he might stretch his cramped body and recover his breath before continuing his onward journey, they should carry it over two miles? Or, if they were approached by a needy, half-clad person to give him a shirt, they should also give him their coat? Therefore, whether in St. Stephen's College, or in the Pembroke College, Cambridge, where he worked before coming out to India, or in the slums in England, where he ministered to "the poorest, the lowliest and the lost," it was this large-hearted love or compassion — characteristic of an apostle — which was the motive behind every public cause he espoused and every project he initiated and implemented.

The years 1912–14 were very memorable in C. F. Andrews' life. In 1912 he met Rabindranath Tagore, in England, on the eve of the latter's being awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature for his classic of songs, the *Gitanjali*. In 1914 he had his first introduction to Gandhiji in South Africa, through Shri Gopal Krishna Gokhale, founder of the Servants of India Society and a stalwart among Indian statesmen. He already knew intimately the Principal, Sushilkumar Rudra, of St. Stephen's College; Mahatma Munshi Ram (later known as Swami Shraddhanand) of

the Arya Samaj and Gurukul in Hardwar; and Mauli Lake-Ullah Sahib of Delhi. These five persons moulded not a little his angle of vision in respect of Indian religion, philosophy, culture, art, and music. The result was his intense interest in these subjects and abounding enthusiasm to convey to his students in particular and to the West in general the central Vision of the Eternal India. He offered the fruit of his deep and wide scholarship in these fields in the form of more than a dozen books. He was, in this way, as he used to say, "re-born," and India became his home. He had so completely identified himself with the people of the country that he was the only Englishman invited to a party once given exclusively for Indians by an Indian member of the Viceregal Council, his gracious host saying to his honoured guest, "We look upon you as one of us."

Before he joined the Santiniketan educational institution of Rabindranath Tagore in 1914, C. F. Andrews and W. W. Pearson — his colleague there — had plunged themselves wholeheartedly into the service of the Indians in some of the colonies of the then far-flung British Empire, especially the indentured labourers who had been imported from India on a mere pittance and who lived and worked in conditions which smacked more of the horrors of hell than of the green, sunny earth inhabited by humans. It was owing to the crusade of the two colleagues against the innumerable injustices heaped upon the victims of this vicious system that, on the strong representations of Lord Hardinge, the then Viceroy of India — a friend of C. F. Andrews — the British Government finally abolished the system. Andrews, therefore, came to be known in the colonies as an unofficial ambassador of good will between Britain and India. After having stayed and worked with Tagore — whom he affectionately called "Gurudeva," just as during the crusade against the Indentured Labour System, he had begun to address Gandhiji as "Mohan," — he became an ambassador of humanity.

It was C. F. Andrews' first-hand insight and experience into the miserable conditions of hundreds of thousands of the overseas Indians and of the villagers in India, and of the slavish mentality of the educated people of the country and their fear of the British rulers, and his study of the history of the world, particularly of England, which prompted him as far back as 1920 to plead for complete Independence for India. He was perhaps the first person to make out a convincing case for it.

His standing up for the claims of Indians overseas to simple humanity and justice had already earned him the great displeasure of the Government. His heartfelt sympathy with the Indian students in their aspiration for their Motherland to come into her own, and his friendship with the followers of different faiths other than Christianity — which in

action, especially in India, was more of churchianity and an ally of the Government in governing the people — further added the displeasure of vested interests, lay as well as missionary. But he continued to live in the Christ and for the Christ, preaching, through his life and labours in the service of humanity, the crucial and central message of the Master of good will towards all and peace on earth. In this his ministry of reconciliation, besides Christ, he was inspired a great deal by Tagore, Gandhiji, Albert Schweitzer, and the Quakers. No doubt he loved all, as was enjoined upon him by his Divine Master; but, as he himself said on more than one occasion, "I love villagers and students more than any other section of the people" — maybe because of their basic simplicity and innocence of the heart. His whole life was an affirmative answer to the age-old question which confronts every one: "Am I my brother's keeper?" He was, indeed, a new edition of the Sermon on the Mount, in concrete compassionate activity for the true well-being of his fellows. Well might this humble tribute to "Christ's Faithful Apostle" be concluded with the words of the song with which Tagore welcomed him on joining the institution at Santiniketan, which he served for nearly a quarter of a century:

From the shrine of the west you have
brought us living water.
We welcome you, friend.
The East has offered you her garland of love.
Accept it and welcome, friend.
Your love has opened the door of our heart,
Enter it and welcome, friend.
You have come to us as a gift of the Lord,
We bow to Him, friend.

As I salute his hallowed memory I pray in all humility and earnestness: "May the world, in general, and India in particular, never forget C. F. Andrews — a noble son and servant of Humanity."

GURDIAL MALLIK

The Child

A small child laughed —
No longer was there sense of past or future;
only the living present,
with time a radiant expanse of Love's beatitude.

WILLIAM EWART WALKER

FLORENCE E. PETTIT

Muriel Lester: World Citizen

[Mrs. Florence E. Pettit has been for many years an active social worker in Britain, and has done much work, especially, as an office-bearer of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. Her previous articles in THE ARYAN PATH based on her visit to Tunisia have shown the width of her sympathies and her well-informed interest in social problems, especially those of women and children, in many countries.

In this brief article she recalls the personality and work of the late Miss Muriel Lester, so kindly and respectfully remembered in India because of her friendship with Gandhiji.—ED.]

I MET MURIEL LESTER more than a decade ago when I was a hostess at a Triennial Conference held that year in Birmingham. Although many women of political and social importance from all over the world attended our Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) Conference (I was a member of the Executive at the time), I felt especially drawn to the upright old lady with the youthful eyes who was companioned there by her beloved sister Doris.

When Muriel died a short while back she was over eighty and I regretted not visiting her at her home in Epping Forest, for I wanted to get to know her better.

She was a Christian Pacifist and a liberal (with a small "l"). She had the capacity for rising above denominational and political restrictions. When asked to what church she belonged she invariably replied that she was trying to be a Christian and she did not like labels. Perhaps, because she had travelled round the world seven times, she could with truth be called a world citizen. Muriel Lester travelled not as a tourist but as an observer, writer, and lecturer; for she had a caring concern for the victims of social and ethnological problems.

Like her American counterpart Jane Addams, who founded the WILPF in 1915, Muriel's home background had been comfortable and refined. Yet like Jane, she chose to concern herself with the poor and the underprivileged. Both could be termed international women, but whereas Jane's work lay mainly in Chicago, Muriel's social projects began in London's Bow.

Just as Jane had to work wherever she saw the need, in pubs, factories, and grimy streets, so Muriel too started up nursery schools, debating and dramatic groups, and ran Bible classes and milk and coffee bars in the heart of her chosen slum. Like Jane also, Muriel and her sister left their comfortable home to actually live among the people they sought to help. They named Kingsley Hall, Bow, after their brother Kingsley who

had died before he was thirty. They lived in a small home on the roof of the social settlement they established, and all sorts of people, including Charles Andrews and Mahatma Gandhi, visited them there.

Muriel suffered for her pacifist beliefs. She was thrown into an internment camp in Trinidad during the war, and was rescued only to find herself locked up for the night in the cell of a dirty Glasgow police-station. From there she was sent to Holloway, and spent a couple of illuminating days there. Pacifists are the least popular of people in wartime, but all her experiences merely increased her determination to play a personal part, to the limits of her strength, towards the lessening of the weight of sorrow and pain that man inflicts so often upon those of his own kind.

As we sat together in the coach that sped towards Shakespeare's birthplace that sunny afternoon when our Conference had ended, I asked Muriel Lester if she would permit me to write her biography; for I, a younger woman, admired, and perhaps envied a little, what appeared to me to have been a very interesting life.

She put my proposition to her sister, who was sitting nearby. Doris thought it a good idea and plans were tentatively made for me to visit the sisters at their Loughton home where in the garden Epstein had carved some of his most controversial pieces. I wanted to do the work very much, but family commitments prevented me; so was not yet free. They smiled understandingly and kindly, and Muriel presented me with a copy of her book *It So Happened*, which Messrs. Harper and Brothers had published for her in 1947. It was dedicated to the Girls and Boys of the Kingsley Hall Schools. Dame Sybil Thorndike, who wrote the Foreword, said then: "In these days of groping and perplexity, it is well to read this book."

Although more than twenty years have passed, we are still living through days of "groping and perplexity." But I like to think the world is a slightly better place because women such as Jane Addams and the Lester sisters passed through it and strove to make improvements as they went along.

Muriel's clear eyes must have witnessed many sad and cruel events; yet her sense of humour and humility kept her steadfast and well balanced. Other pacifist bodies as well as the WILPF sprang up during the First World War and Muriel's main interest in the thirties, prior to the happenings of the Second, was with The Fellowship of Reconciliation. She was made its travelling secretary and she travelled extensively on its behalf, trying to pour oil on troubled waters; encouraging people to talk out their differences before tempers heated up and angry words were spoken.

She visited China, Japan, and India, and she was in Germany during a very critical time. She found young people of most countries bewildered,

yet as eager as they are today to play their part towards helping to create a better world for themselves and others. She sometimes found the older generation bewildered too, but they were growing apathetic, tired, and dispirited.

When she visited America she travelled in the first *Queen Mary*, which she did not like, saying that its engines sounded like the beating of an anxious heart.

Although she voluntarily spent much of her life among people who lived in dirt and squalor, Muriel Lester loved clear skies, pure air, and open landscapes, and she did much of her writing out of doors, just wherever she happened to be. She met many important and influential people, but she was just as much at home with the nobodies of this world; for to her everyone was a somebody — everybody mattered. She loathed flying; yet she often had to travel by air in the course of her work. How she would have hated today's jumbo jets!

Believing strongly in the power of prayer, she shocked even her friends when she suggested that they should all pray for Hitler. One wonders whether, had they obeyed her simple behest, the course of world history might not have been changed.

When the then Bishop of Birmingham said that we ought to feed our enemies, even in wartime, and appalled the members of the House of Convocation he was addressing, Muriel publicly supported him. I had the impression when I talked with her that, although her sincerity was above question, she took an immense delight in going against the stream at times.

Muriel's books are now out of print and some of her prayers have perhaps been answered in inexplicable ways. Yet I am very glad that her life touched mine for a moment in passing. One of my purposes in writing this article is that I hope one of her many friends or relatives will come forward to write the life-story that I was not able to because marriage and motherhood were making demands on my time and energy.

Before she died Muriel Lester was made a Freeman of Poplar. I remember her with affection as a Free Woman of the World.

FLORENCE E. PETTIT

Begin to search and dig in thine own field for this pearl of eternity that lies hidden in it; it cannot cost thee too much, nor canst thou buy it too dear, for it is *all*; and when thou hast found it thou wilt know that all which thou hast sold or given away for it is as mere a nothing as a bubble upon the water.

—WILLIAM LAW

New Books and Old

"Modern India and the West"*

ON 15 August 1947, the Indian "sub-continent" was artificially — almost arbitrarily — cut up into the two independent nations of India and Pakistan. One hundred and ninety years after the Battle of Plassey and ninety years after the Mutiny, British rule had at long last come to an end. How shall we cast the balance-sheet of British rule, now that the story has ended with a bang as well as a split? Perhaps, the time for such an exercise has not arrived yet. We do not know all the facts, and we are too close to the double-event of Partition and Independence, and also too deeply involved in its passions and frustrations, to be able to bring the necessary objectivity to such a study. In the meantime, we might reread with profit the voluminous book under review, first published in 1941 and now conveniently reissued.

The "India" of Mr. O'Malley's book comprises both present-day "India" (Bharat) and "Pakistan." The title and sub-title of the volume are alike rather misleading. In this context, the "West" largely means "Britain"; for excepting the peripheral influence of the Portuguese, the Dutch, and the French before the consolidation of British power in India, the west wind — "O wild west wind!" — usually blew *via* Britain. As for the "interaction," only one chapter out of fifteen is devoted to the "far smaller influence which India has had upon the West." The book is thus essentially a study of the impact of British rule on pre-Partition India.

Although this formidable work, sponsored by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, is the "co-operative enterprise" of several scholars, it is obvious that Mr. O'Malley has shouldered the main responsibility. He contributes 5 out of the 15 chapters (accounting for nearly 400 out of the total 800 pages), including the two opening chapters and the long concluding chapter. In the chapter on "Literature and Drama," only 6 out of the 14 or 15 major literatures in India are covered. Among the authors of the other chapters, there is one Hindu and there is also one Muslim. But by and large, this "co-operative survey" is rather a British apologia for the colonial rule Britain had imposed on India. There is no question about the scholarship, the array of facts and figures, the whirl of names, and the comprehensive coverage (the Index alone runs to twenty-two pages), but one cannot escape the feeling that the total aim of the undertaking is to show that the British had found India in a condition of chaos and bankruptcy, but had succeeded — as it were, in spite of the people of India — in establishing the rule of law and setting the country on the road to progress. Lest one should demur that this is, perhaps, a partisan view, one of the contributors invokes the authority of "an impartial view, one of Professor D. A. Buchanan, of the United States," who has said that "in maintaining peace, unifying the country, developing communications and setting up a standard of integrity and industry" the British government "has accomplished more than could have been expected of any other government, Indian or foreign, during this period."

In his brief Foreword, Lord Meston remarks that "the metaphor of the impact is inappropriate ..."; there has been "nothing, or very little, of a clash" between the two cultures. The trauma of conquest was nothing. It was all so gentle, so civilized — like a stream flow-

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* *Modern India and the West: A Study of the Interaction of Their Civilizations.* Edited by L. S. S. O'MALLEY. (Oxford University Press, London. 834 pp. 1968. Rs. 63 00)

ing, like a breeze blowing — and it was all to the advantage of India! No violence at all; just peaceful penetration! One is here reminded of the old adage that it is the wearer alone who knows where the shoe pinches. Like His Lordship, most of the other British contributors too are suave and superior, and write with a self-satisfied air. There is no deliberate falsification, but one does notice the play of defective sensibility or a lack of a sense of measure. For example, Mr. O'Malley cites from Mr. N. Macnicol (p. 779fn.) the story of an Indian professor who had expressed his regret for having given his son the name of "Rama Chandra" with its religious associations instead of the name "Electricity." And this fantastic story is meant to bear "startling witness to the spirit which is abroad among the educated people." Nothing can be cruder than this generalization. Neither our foremost physicist, C. V. Raman, nor our Marxist M.P., P. Ramamurti, has seen anything wrong in the name "Rama" with its "religious associations." People have, perhaps, named children after Lenin and Stalin, as an earlier generation gave the name "Hume," but nobody has been given the name "Electricity."

In the two opening chapters — "The Historical Background" and "The Impact of European Civilization" — Mr. O'Malley taxies, and takes off, to give us a quick aerial view of the subject in its bewildering complexity. The theme is poverty, oppression, and misery in India. The Hindu rulers had charged one-sixth of the produce as tax; Akbar raised it to one-third; and in Shah Jehan's time it rose to half. Predatory chieftains — Muslim, Maratha, or Jat — lay the country waste. "The great ones eat up the little," said Sir Thomas Roe; "the greater rob the lesser and the King robs all." On the other hand, the institutions of the joint family, the village panchayat, and the caste system somehow held Hindu society together. Between 1757 and 1857, the British established themselves firmly in India, and during this period "the forces of change had been enough to alarm but not enough to influence." Certain positive steps had no doubt been taken — abolition of *sati* and slavery, the introduction of the new education — but modern India is "practically a post-Mutiny creation." Famines, floods, and epidemics have caused devastation and misery, yet from 1857 to 1919 was a period of peaceful progress, and among the unifying influences was the new spirit of nationalism generated by the founding of the Congress in 1885. But with nationalism came, in R. P. Karkaria's words, "the art of agitation ... with all its Western machinery." And successive generations of young men have sought inspiration from Mazzini — or Marx — or Lenin, Stalin, or Mao.

Sir Benjamin Lindsay's chapter on "Law" is a quick résumé of the efforts at the codification of the laws of India. Much of the English law, shorn of its "cumbrous and pompous nonsense," has been taken over by India. In the matter of personal law, however, the Muslims resisted amendment more resolutely than the Hindus. Mr. J. R. Cunningham's chapter on "Education" is very informative. Between 1927 and 1936, enrolment in collegiate, secondary, and primary education increased by 34%, 67%, and 21% respectively, but with only a 4% increase in the cost to public funds! As early as 1889 at least, educated unemployment seems to have been a problem in Bengal (and all India). And Mr. O'Malley, in his concluding chapter, refers to "student unrest" fanned assiduously by communism and the trade-union spirit. In 1939, a Pradesh Congress President bemoaned the fact that student organizations were spreading anarchy, indiscipline, and violence, and "unleashing forces which they cannot control." As for the study of English in India, Mr. Cunningham writes that "it must continue for some time at least to be the language of the universities." For some time! It may not be long.

Writing on "The Press," Mr. W. C. Wordsworth pays a well-merited compliment to the great editors from Ram-

mohan Roy and Keshab Chunder Sen to Malabári and Tilak:

> India ... remembers them as few journalists are remembered in England; they live in the mind as instructors live, for India reveres its teachers.

Mr. O'Malley begins his essay on "Mechanism and Transport" with the left-handed compliment that "the genius of the people was more introspective than practical." And he concludes with the remark that the Indians are "not machine-minded." Nevertheless, the Western contact has meant the introduction of printing machinery, posts and telegraphs, railways, air travel, the cinema, and the radio. In her essay, "Economic Development," Dr. Vera Anstey brings together some interesting statistics, and states that since 1764 "economic development" *has* occurred; and this, in spite of "the 'drain' up to about 1813." On the other hand, the proportion of the well-to-do (i.e., the upper and middle classes) has remained more or less stationary at about 5% of the population.

Mr. Arthur Mayhew on "The Christian Ethic in India," Dr. Radhakrishnan on "Hinduism and the West," and A. Yusuf Ali on "Muslim Culture and Religious Thought" are all interesting exercises in looking at the religious problem of India from three different angles. In the chapter on "The Hindu Social System," Mr. O'Malley describes Hindu society as a synthesis of groups, not of individuals. To reinforce a point on the extent of female infanticide, he cites from a census report to the effect that in a particular community of Rajputs no girls were to be found: "there never have been any, nor has such an event as the marriage of a daughter taken place for more than two hundred years" (p. 357). No girls, and no marriages, for more than two hundred years: how, then, did this community survive? And this is the sort of evidence that comes to Mr. O'Malley as milk to a cat; he must lap it up with zest. Mr. J. H. Hutton on "Primitive Tribes" and Mr. H. Grey on "The Progress of Women" describe how the *adivasis* and aboriginals on the one hand and the Indian women on the other are slowly freeing themselves from the shackles of the past, but also moving uncertainly towards strange new horizons. Christian missionaries, Hindu or Pathan moneylenders, and government officials are all so many varieties of evil for the *adivasis*, but the wind of change is something that cannot now be turned back. Their old obscurity and security are gone; and it will take time before they can make terms with the new ruthless monetary economy. As for the women, they are coming into their own. Today the Prime Minister is a woman, and this is a hint of the direction of the new wind of change.

The 237-page "General Survey" by Mr. O'Malley is a considerable feat of condensation. There is some new matter, and there is some repetition too; but in a book of this size, occasional repetition is no serious defect. Mr. O'Malley quotes a young civil servant as saying in 1832 that "our government is, so far as the natives are concerned, a pure despotism, one of the most cheerless and uninviting kind." Things changed, no doubt — local self-government came, dyarchy came — but for another one hundred years a "despotism" it remained. The British official (and, in later years, his brown counterpart) was Mr. Zabardast — not necessarily an oppressor, perhaps, but at least a man with insufferable airs of his own. Mr. O'Malley's airs too, and his readiness to indict a whole nation on flimsy evidence, are insufferable. His monumental industry, his capacity for absorbing facts and odd bits of information, and his flair for narrative are all commendable enough. But India is only a "subject" or an "assignment" to him, and throughout he seems to feel superior to his subject. He has collected his material with assiduous care; he has evidently devoted years to this project; but, lacking love for the country or the people, he has missed the heart of the matter. Like a computer he trots out these findings: the masses in India are

ignorant of the first principles of science; astrologers make a good living in India; marriages are determined by horoscopes; there are three Indias (urban, rural, and tribal); and so on. And, in conclusion, he declares that, "although the influence of modern India on the West has been comparatively slight, Western civilization has made a deep impression on the life of India, political, social, religious, economic and cultural." Don't you see, the West has given India *far more* than it has received! Also, culturally, "the life of the villager is scarcely affected by Western influences"; and the villages are at least four-fifths India! There is nothing wrong in Mr. O'Malley's telling the English reader what a fine job — with an adverse cultural balance of payments — Britain did in India. Much of what is said in the book is doubtless true. Yet the book is vitiated by its approach and tone. To set the record right, a group of Indian scholars should engage in this task and assess — for the enlightenment of the Indian reader — the lasting results of the British (and Western) impact on India.

K. R. SRINIVASA IYENGAR

Dr. V. Raghavan Felicitation Volume. (Vols. 31-32 of *Brahmavidya,* The Adyar Library Bulletin, Madras. 670 pp. 1968.)

Dr. V. Raghavan is undoubtedly one of our foremost Sanskritists and Indologists. His work has been recognized all the world over and he has travelled widely. A member of innumerable learned societies, he is the author of seventy-nine books and over seven hundred papers. He was awarded the Padmabhushan in 1962 and has been the recipient of several other distinctions. This Felicitation Volume contains the contributions from his numerous scholarly friends and admirers presented to him on the completion of his sixtieth year. It is appropriately published by the Adyar Library and Research Centre, with whose activities Dr. V. Raghavan has been connected for over thirty years. For this reason, perhaps, Dr. Raghavan himself is among the Editors of the volume.

The contributors are all from overseas and hail from every part of the academic world. There are thirty-eight papers, out of which three are in French, with very brief summaries appended. A large number of them are specialists' articles on some point or other of purely technical interest and, as such, are wholly beyond the purview of the layman. But quite a few relate to philosophical, literary, and other topics of general interest. With due respect, it may be said that they contain little that is original or striking, and are good examples of painstaking routine research.

Among these, a few may be singled out for brief notice. Dr. Masatoshi Nagatomi of Harvard writes on the concept of *Arthakriyā.* It was the Existentialists in recent times who stressed the distinction between existence, and essence as conceived by rationalists. But *Arthakriyā* combines the notion of existence (*Sattva*) with that of essence (*Sattā*), and could furnish the basis of a whole philosophy. The article, however, confines itself to the elucidation of the double significance of this term as used by the Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti. With Dharmakīrti, *Arthakriyā* meant epistemologically "the fulfilment of a human purpose" and ontologically "causal power."

Dr. Sengaku Mayeda of the University of Pennsylvania discusses the question of the authenticity of the commentaries on the *Māndūkyopaniṣad* and the *Gauḍapāda Kārikās* which are attributed to Śaṁkara, but whose authorship has been questioned by some comparative scholars. Dr. Mayeda carefully compares this commentary with Śaṁkara's commentary on the *Brahmasūtra* with specific regard to the use of eight crucial terms; *Avidyā, Nāmarūpa, Māyā, Īśvara, Ānanda, Vivarta, Śiva,* and *Vyāsa,* and finds that the usages in both are in complete consonance. He

answers the four main arguments brought up by objectors and comes to the conclusion that this commentary is one of Śaṁkara's genuine works.

Dr. R. H. L. Slater of Harvard in his article "Modern Comparative studies of Religion and the Hindu Tradition" stresses the fact that modern scholars are inclined to pay greater regard to pregnant poetic symbols as expressing more than can be reduced to propositional statements. There is also the suggestion that what may be expressed in story form cannot be as fully or as adequately expressed in any other form; it is as meaningful, perhaps more meaningful, for the sophisticated as well as for the simple. This has meant, for instance, fuller appreciation of the great epic scriptures and the *Bhakti* hymns as well as of the significance, which Dr. Raghavan has emphasized, of the expositions and recitals which still mean so much to Hindu people. It is also significant that these expositions attract, as he points out, "all classes of society." Thus they may be regarded as influencing the religious outlook of the learned as well as the simple, an observation which calls in question any sharp separation between "popular Hinduism" and "philosophic Hinduism."

Dr. George B. Burch of Tufts University, who has published a comprehensive survey of K. C. Bhattacharyya's philosophy, adds a footnote here by way of a supplementary article. According to Dr. Bhattacharyya, ordinary experience is a mixture of knowing, willing, and feeling. Each of the three is the Absolute, but they are incompatible and incapable of reduction or synthesis. These are divergent ways leading, as it were, to different mountain peaks, each a summit.

Among other essays of some note may be mentioned "Some Modern Views of the *Manusaṁhitā*" by Professor D. Mackenzie Brown of Prescott College, U.S.A.; "Types of Kashmirian Society in Kṣemendra's Time" by Dr. J. R. A. Loman of Leiden; "Indian Asceticism in its Historical Development" by Professor Ludwik Skurzak of the University of Wroclaw, Poland; "Brāhman and Peasant in Early South Indian History" by Dr. Burton Stein of the University of Hawaii; "The Oldest Sanskrit Fables" by Dr. George T. Artola of the University of Toronto and Hawaii; "On Non-violence and the Modern Technical World" by Unto Tähtinen of the University of Turku, Finland; and "On Transfer of Merit" by Professor Minoru Hara of the University of Tokyo.

This sampling and selection naturally follows the reviewer's own lines of interest; and it is, of course, possible that with a slight change of angle an altogether different choice might be made. On the whole, this volume presents a substantial contribution to Indological studies and is a fitting tribute to the lifelong work and achievements of Dr. V. Raghavan.

K. GURU DUTT

Journal of the American Oriental Society. Vol. 87, No. 4, October-December 1967. Ed. by ERNEST BENDER *et al.* (American Oriental Society, Yale, New Haven, U.S.A. 300 pp. $3.00; annual subscription $11.50)

For a little more than a century and a quarter this Journal has been the forum of the endeavour of American scholars in various aspects of the study of the Orient and recently of linguistics also. Some of the contributions have been found to be of great value to Orientalists the world over.

The present issue, which is representative of this great tradition, opens with a very valuable contribution to linguistics, particularly in the Dravidian field, by Professor Emeneau, a foremost authority on the subject, who shares with us some of the field data he has been collecting for more than a decade now. The purpose of his long and well-documented paper, "The South Dravidian Languages," is "to present evidence for sub-grouping" the three

South Dravidian languages Toda, Kota, and Koḍagu. As the speakers of these languages are culturally and socially near to speakers of Kannada, it is commonly believed that they are also linguistically close. It is, however, Emeneau's finding that the two Nilgiri languages, Toda and Kota, are more akin to the Tamil-Malayalam group than to Kannada. Kannada scholars would do well to look into the problem. As for Koḍagu, in most respects it

> belongs more closely with the rest of S. Dr. than with Kannada, with the proviso that in a few points there are isoglosses that join Kodagu with Kannada. (p. 366)

The chief test employed to arrive at this conclusion is the study of the past tense in all these languages.

Three more papers in this Journal pertain to linguistics; the first of these, by S. Vaidyanathan, lists thirty-four Indo-Aryan loan-words in the *Cīvakacintāmaṇi*, a Jain epic, dated around A.D. 600 in the Middle Tamil period. The Sanskrit equivalent of *Kāmukan* in Middle Tamil can be *Kāmuka* in Sanskrit, and not necessarily *Kāmukha* (p. 432). As a personal name one name is as ludicrous as the other. Andreas Koutsoudas points out that the object constructions in Lebanese Arabic contain "not one but two distinct *la* particles" (p. 512 ff.). The aim of Udom Warotamesikkhadit is to give the "phonological component of a transformational grammar of Thai based on the theory introduced by Chomsky and Halle"; he presents an "appropriate set of rules for converting surface syntactic structures involving dictionary representations in the lexical component of the grammar into correct phonetic forms" (p. 541).

J. Gonda cannot agree (p. 413) with Meyer that Indra is "*der uralte Frühlings-und Früchtsbarkeitsgott*" (a very ancient Spring and fertility god), but has no objection to accepting that the ancient Indra festival (*mahotsava*) might be "the Indian counterpart of the European Maypole and Midsummer Day festivities" (p. 413). He also gives two new Atharvaṇic descriptions (*Kauśikasūtra* 10 and *Atharvavedapariśiṣṭa* 19) not examined by Meyer.

Leon Hurvitz gives the Chinese text and translation of the portion of Vasubhadra's *Abhidharma* text concerned with the road to Buddhist salvation. Rifa'at A. Abou-el-Haj writes on "Ottoman Diplomacy at Karlowitz." Richard A. Henshaw explains the important office of *Śaknu* (a military leader in charge of the army) in Neo-Assyrian times. Briggs Buchanan gives an account of the prehistoric stamp-seal after a reconsideration of old excavations. Hala Salam and E. S. Kennedy give an account of solar and lunar tables in Islamic astronomy based on a study of the few documents of the first half of the ninth century.

H. G. NARAHARI

Posthumous Pieces. By WEI WU WEI. (Hong Kong University Press; Oxford University Press, Bombay. 232 pp. 1968. HK $25.00)

This book is presented to the reader as Wei Wu Wei's "last work." The reader is apt to imagine that the writer is no more; but as a matter of fact he is very much alive. He humorously explains that these pieces are called posthumous not because he is dead, but because they are the tombstones and record of living intuitions, which, "embalmed in relative terminology, are well and truly dead."

The book opens with a consideration of the nature of time and space. This is a problem which has exercised the minds of philosophers from Plotinus and Augustine to Kant and Bergson. The idea of *Dura* is central to the philosophy of Bergson and Wei's "Posthumous" pieces remind one strongly of Bergson's *Time and Free Will*, a book which created a sensation in the early decades of the present century. It will be recalled that Bergson makes a distinction between a time that is a symbol

of space with a discernible past and present and future and a time which flows continuously like a stream which has neither a beginning nor a middle nor an end — an Eternal Now. Our intellect cuts up time into parts for the purpose of the activity which we call life; but it is through intuition, or *dhyāna,* as the Buddhist would say, that we identify ourselves with the flow of time and become it, and, in the process, transcend it. In a sense, therefore, man belongs both to the temporal and the eternal worlds. As Eckhart puts it:

> Time is what keeps the light from reaching us. There is no greater obstacle to God than time. And not only time but temporalities, not only temporal things, but temporal affections, not only temporal affections but the very taint and smell of time.

And again:

> Three things prevent a man from knowing God. The first is time, the second is corporeality, the third is multiplicity. That God may come in, these things must go out — except thou have them in a higher, better way: multitude summed up to one in thee.

With these views of the philosopher and mystic, Wei would be in entire agreement. The earlier pieces in the book almost read like pages from Bergson. Consider this, for example, from the piece entitled "Come to Think Of It":

> One must be tireless in pointing out that unless we ... face up to the apparent problem of what time is we shall never see the way things are. ...
>
> And "time" is wholly dependent on "things" (objects perceived) in order that it may be cognized and conceptualized as "time," for without objects perceived, being perceived, about to be perceived, there could be no "time" — for "time" is only the cognition of "things in duration."

Sudden Enlightenment according to Wei means precisely the immediate apperception of all that in fact we are. It is sudden because it is not in time or subject to sequential duration. It is reintegration in timelessness. It follows therefore that birth and death are relative concepts which have no noumenal reality. Birth, life, death are concepts extended in a space-time context and experienced in the mind like all phenomenal manifestations. The book closes with a Posthumous Postscript which may well be described as an epitome of the book:

> Birthless and undying
> How could I "live"?
> Never having "lived"
> How could I die"?
>
> Time and infinite,
> Unextended in space-time,
> Unliving, undying,
> Unbeing, I AM.
>
> PPS. And so are you.

B. V. NARAYANA REDDY

The Human Evasion. By CELIA GREEN. (Hamish Hamilton Ltd., London. 126 pp. 1969. 21*s.*)

The writer of this dynamic and provocative little book is far from sharing the mental attitude that gives it its title. Wittily, yet sagely, she discusses "evasion" in religion, philosophy, and science, in the social organism and in personal life.

Much of her insight and irony is brought to bear on the meaning of "sanity," which appears to her largely "a device for protecting the individual from the impact of facts," thus ensuring adjustment to this mysterious universe by what one might call conditioned self-deception. For facts imply reality, and total reality might distress us, since it "consists of everything that appears inconceivable to the human mind." A wholly "sane" person very properly ignores it. Hence the "interesting result that if anyone does take an interest in reality he is almost certain to be told that he is running away from it."

This is but one of the popular catchphrases with which Miss Green makes merry play in the enjoyable chapter on

"How to Write Sane Books," beautifully pricking such bubbles as "a transcendent source of meaning," "gropings after an undefined otherness," "infinite and inexhaustible ground of history" — even when these are blown by experts, by Dr. Niebuhr, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and Paul Tillich. Miss Green's clear-sightedness and skill in this are her own form of reverence.

But while heady mountain air exhilarates some climbers, it can lead to vertigo in others, and it may possibly be so with readers. The non-sane among them — see Chapter XI for definition — may be the likeliest to keep their balance!

JOAN N. BURNETT

Conversations: Christian and Buddhist. Encounters in Japan. By DOM AELRED GRAHAM. (William Collins, Sons and Company Ltd., London. xvi+206 pp. 1969. 30*s*.)

The author is a distinguished Benedictine monk with an international reputation as a theologian. For the most part his writings have been in terms of Roman Catholic exposition, but recently he entered into a wider field with his *Zen Catholicism,* a study of two great and seemingly disparate religious traditions in parallel. This outstanding example of the current art of dialogue was warmly received on both sides of the discussion, many holding that the new understanding of and sympathy with the other helped them to fresh appreciation of their own. For Dom Aelred himself the writing of the book stimulated him to go further and deeper into the matter. He made a stay in Japan, regarded by him as the most suitable context in which to study the living tradition of Mahayana Buddhism, and there met and talked with a number of varied and representative persons for whom Shakyamuni, the Buddha, is as significant as is Jesus the Christ for him and his fellows. Of these meetings, concerned not with polite exchanges of the time of day and the weather but with central concerns of the human spirit, this book is the record.

It affords a splendid example of the gospel description of the wise scribe who brings from his treasury things old and new. The splendid and coherent records of these discussions on age-old verities has been made possible by the skill of a friend in using a tape-recorder. The present writer has never found this device (which can be so abominable in inhibiting freedom of speech) used to better purpose. The conversations range over a very wide field, most of the subjects being predictable but some, e.g., the use of LSD, quite startling. The contents and conclusions will strike different readers in different ways, though there can be very few who will read this record without profit.

The really important thing is that in this exercise of experience based on study a western Catholic should be asking Buddhists to expound their own religion in its own terms. This point Dom Aelred stresses in his Foreword. He is out to take Buddhism "with the seriousness with which it takes itself." This he properly regards as a significant moment in the story of religion. Let him speak the final words himself:

> Here ... is the supremely worthwhile religious encounter: any vital religious discussion in today's world must move, not at the peripheral level of Christian ecclesiology, which still preoccupies so many Catholic theologians, but at the basically existential level of who we are and what human life is all about.

MARCUS WARD

Philosophies of Existence: An Introduction to the Basic Thought of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Jaspers, Marcel, Sartre. By JEAN WAHL. Translated from the French by F. M. LORY. (Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., London. viii+ 126 pp. 1969. £1 5*s.*, i.e., £1.25)

With its perceptive discrimination, juxtaposition, and scrutiny of existentialist categories — not least of the categories of existence, being, nothingness, freedom, situation, communication, dread — this latest book by Professor Jean Wahl is certainly more than a mere introduction to existentialist thought — or, as its English critics might be tempted to say, to existentialist declamation. Even so, the book can be exasperating. It is not even without a practical purpose. The author hopes that it might inspire in the reader "a new mode of thought that will combine sharpened subjectivity with a deep sense of communion with others and with the world" (p. vii).

Yet with its twofold theoretical purpose there is the danger of nothing so much as hurried shots at unresolved obscurities. It has so much to say, and the reader cannot but welcome whatever it says, on the history and the contemporary condition of existentialist fundamentals. Yet by seeking to determine what is the precise wisdom of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Jaspers, Marcel, Sartre, on each of these fundamentals, it cannot easily do justice, within its 120 pages, either to these fundamentals or to these writers.

Nevertheless, although Professor Wahl's numerous and conflicting citations scarcely help to illuminate the truth as to reality, they certainly help to expose the nature of existentialism. For this is not merely a complex doctrine, since here

> there are elements that are properly existential ... retraceable to Kierkegaard. There are phenomenological elements deriving from Husserl and found particularly in Heidegger and Sartre. There are Hegelian elements. There are ontological elements. (p. 85)

It is difficult to give a decisive answer as to what existentialism is finally and distinctively, inasmuch as its ministers contradict not merely one another but themselves.

> And this leads us back to the assertion that ambiguity is a fundamental category of these philosophies — ambiguity between idealism and realism, ambiguity between freedom and commitment, between pessimism and social action. But this ambiguity is possibly one of the sources of the value and the popularity of these philosophies. (p. 107)

Certainly these philosophies should be grateful to Professor Wahl for expounding them with such sympathy, insight, patience, candour, and persuasiveness.

M. KAYE

The Keats-Shelley Memorial Association Bulletin, Number XIX. (The Keats-Shelley Memorial Association, London. 52 pp. 1968. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

The murmurs of the "New Critics" notwithstanding, the Romantics continue to hold the affection of millions of poetry addicts. The Keats-Shelley Memorial Association has, for many years, fostered this love in a quiet, unobtrusive manner. Though ostensibly named after Keats and Shelley, the Association has in reality concerned itself generally with the age of the Romantics. It is not, therefore, surprising that this issue should be partly devoted to Lord Byron. Herbert Huscher discusses at length the novel *Anastasius,* once attributed to Lord Byron. The real author was Thomas Hope, an inveterate traveller, a wealthy aristocrat, and the author of the standard treatise, *Household Furniture and Interior Decoration.* Another interesting contribution is J. J. McGann's note on an unpublished fragment of Lord Byron. The poet was inspired by Jacques Cazotte's *Le Diable Amourex* and wished to write a "more philanthropical" poem but gave up the attempt. Subsequently, some of the

stanzas in this unfinished poem were woven into the tapestry of *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage*. In another article, J. J. McGann considers the stageworthiness of Byron's *Cain,* a poetic play that powerfully portrays the many elemental passions that lie dormant in human consciousness. In the article that follows, Robert Mortenson relates adroitly P. D. Hardy's *Abel: A Mystery* to Lord Byron's *Cain: A Mystery*. Hardy's play was one of the many "replies" to Byron's unorthodox portrayal of Cain. Indeed, like Milton's Satan, Cain assumes a heroic stature in the play, eliciting the sympathy of the audience. But Hardy's play, for all his good intentions, has no place in the mainstream of English literature; it remains only a literary curiosity. This issue of the *Bulletin* also contains interesting notes on Shelley contributed by Gavin de Beer, Burton Polin, Neville Rogers, and Timothy Webb. In the last, there is an enquiry whether, when Shelley was drowned, he had, in addition to a copy of Keats's poems, a copy of Sophocles (or Aeschylus) as well; Mr. Webb's conclusion is that "the factual basis" for the story "is negligible."

PREMA NANDAKUMAR

The Message of the Ṛshis: Studies in the Upanishads from the Standpoint of a Christian Reader. By ANJILVEL V. MATTHEW. (The Christian Institute for the Study of Religion and Society, Bangalore. 96 pp. 1967. Rs. 3.50)

Dr. Matthew has written several books in English and Malayalam. His subjects have been the Christian religion, psychology, education, and social problems. A special aspect of his writing has been his several contributions on Hinduism and its philosophy from a Christian point of view. This small book belongs to this group of his writings.

He approaches the subject with the observation that the philosophical and religious thought of Hinduism is an "unacknowledged heritage" of most Indian Christians. From this point of view, he sets out to examine the major teachings of the Upanishads, and his approach is to see what they can yield of use and value to the sincere Christian student. Accordingly he has several chapters which describe simply, but with appropriate quotations and references from the ancient texts, what the Upanishads have to say on such fundamental topics as God, nature, ethical conduct, home life, the role of the Guru, and God's grace. Dr. Matthew's explanations are reasonably well authenticated, though he is of necessity presenting a general view and not entering into the subtle distinctions made by various schools of philosophy based on the Upanishads.

Dr. Matthew's approach is sympathetic and fair-minded. On a few points one might not quite agree with him, as for example in his remark that the Christian reader "finds nowhere in the Upanishads any mention of God as love." On the question of Grace also he perhaps over-emphasizes the differences between the Christian and the Hindu views, although he does point out some of the elements of similarity.

Dr. Matthew's outlook may be fairly represented by the following quotation:

> We the disciples of Christ in no way disparage the noble and inspired teachers of the Upanishads and the *Gita* when we hold that their view of God is completed and transformed by the advent of *God himself as man* once in history. The present writer is convinced that just as men like Moses, Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Isaiah of Babylon knew God and spoke to their generations of the holiness and grace of God, in the same way the rshis and acharyas and other saints of India, men like Yajnavalkya, the teacher of the *Gita,* Sankara, Ramanuja, Kabir, Tukaram and many others, also knew God and spoke of Him to their people. The vision of both groups of saints was, however, fragmentary.

This claim to uniqueness on the part of even broad-minded and tolerant Christians remains one of the unresolved differences which prevent an ap-

proach to spiritual reality in itself, as transcending all particular philosophies and opinions.

Nevertheless, such a study as Dr. Matthew has made of a religion other than his own is of value even though it cannot in itself show us a way of passing beyond barriers created by separate religions.

G. R. C.

The Story of Fulfilled Prophecy. By JUSTINE GLASS. (Cassell and Company Ltd., London. xii+212 pp. 1969. 25*s*., i.e., £1.25)

The author of this book, who died soon after it was finished, was a successful columnist in the London *Daily Sketch,* whose weekly mail bag, dealing mainly with personal problems, averaged some forty-five thousand letters.

Herself interested in occultism, she has written for the ordinary reader, not for the scholar or researcher. In fact, when the prophecies cited are not familiar, one could wish that the book had a few source references or a bibliography. Miss Glass has been indefatigable in collecting her instances, but made little attempt to understand the rationale; so that the book is best dipped into for fascinating titbits from its *bouillabaisse*. If read straight through, it could produce something of the exhaustion felt by sightseers "doing London" in one day.

Miss Glass has cast her net wide — tales of ancient Egypt, prophecies of rulers-to-be and dooms to come, Roman sibyls, ambiguous Greek oracles, Chaldean astrologers, Druid seers; Tibetan wonders, Persian predictions, Chinese tortoise-divinations and the sixty-four hexagrams; Mexico's astrological calendar and omens of the Spanish conquest, visions of Irish saints and prophecies about the Popes (apparently there are only four more to come!); prophecies about the French and American revolutions, stories of voodoo objects, curses and dreams. Characters like Nostradamus, the Brahan seer, John Dee, Mother Shipton, and, of the moderns, Cheiro, Edgar Cayce, Jeane Dixon, have their quota of attention. All this in 196 pages! The last chapter raises the perennial question of predestination or free will, and the author concludes:

> We may not yet understand why precognition need not imply predestination; the understanding which matters most to all of us is prophecy's implication that the human spirit is not imprisoned in the limited world of the five senses.

E. WHITE

Ends and Sayings

"· · · ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."

—SAMUEL BUTLER: *Hudibras*

Auriol Stevens (*The Guardian,* 28 May 1969) writes of a highly successful venture at Wanstead High School, London, which, though nominally part of an endeavour to bring technology into schools, is more truly educational than a great deal of formal instruction and examination work. This technological project has been going on for three years, the incentive of the scheme being aid for disabled children, though in actuality the benefit to those who help is as great as that to the recipients.

Two special schools for physically

handicapped children and an Observation Unit for psychotic and autistic children are linked with Wanstead High School. The pupils of the latter help — if they wish — teachers and therapists in their classrooms at the special schools and unit. From this comes awareness of the special needs and individual problems of the handicapped children, which are then dealt with practically, often most successfully, at Wanstead by the pupils themselves. The problems are worked upon by any child interested. Examples that show insight and resourcefulness as well as skill are: the making of "a felt glove puppet with gnashing teeth and lolling tongue" to meet a fingerless girl's need for hand exercise; the construction of an ingenious piece of engineering to enable a wheelchair to be moved in and out of an awkward house door; or the alteration of tricycles for spastic children with little muscular control of their legs. One particularly happy instance is that of the

> terror gang of twelve-year-old boys [who] organized themselves into an assembly line to design, make, and print two packs of colour "snap" cards for children who find colour matching a problem.

Originally the Wanstead staff organized the work, but in order to encourage the older children to participate (the age groups that tended to fight shy), the responsibility for running "Aid for the Disabled" was turned over to the pupils themselves, with excellent results. Another significant point is the fact that "the most unlikely children turn out to be the most resourceful inventors."

The project raises its own funds without direct subsidies, though it gratefully accepts gifts of equipment etc.—the last being £20,000 from the Bristol Good Neighbour Trust for a special workshop and permanent HQ. The fundamental value of the scheme, however, is the opportunity given for personal thought and interest, personal contact and kindness, the fact that teachers, therapists, and children, normal and handicapped, are brought together by a common and rewarding cause, since the help given is primarly that which will help the handicapped to help themselves. As for the eager inventors and constructors, their gain in self-development (head, heart, and hands), and in the satisfaction of unselfish achievement, cannot be measured in statistical terms. And for the social scientist, the lesson for him is that nothing and no-one (certainly no child) can be labelled "good" or "bad" and left at that. This project points to one way to educe the true potential.

"No man is an island." And no movement either, however valuable, can remain in isolation. Few vegetarians, for example, are simply vegetarians and nothing else. Vegetarianism finds links with natural ways of living, natural types of medicine and therapy, humanitarian movements, concern for animals and with ecological science. Thus the last issue (May-June 1969) of *The British Vegetarian* is especially interesting in this respect. In the Editorial "Conservation or Cruelty?" Geoffrey L. Rudd writes of the cruelties of hunting and blood sports, of those involved in acquiring animals for zoos, as well as the tortures of vivisection; but he makes a special plea for the recognition and condemnation of cruelties produced by the techniques of scientific observation and conservation (the netting, ringing, and pinioning of birds; similar methods with animals; disturbances of habitats, etc.)

In this issue also the Promoters of Animal Welfare present the case for the many available alternatives to the use of laboratory animals in medical research. Dr. Douglas Latto's warning article, "Smoking," indicates it as the chief cause of lung cancer, and packs a wealth of supporting evidence, as well as advice on stopping the addiction, into less than six pages. It is a sad commentary on human "pigheadedness" and stupidity that despite all the medical, press, and other publicity given to the danger, the U.K. expenditure on ciga-

rettes in 1968 was over £1,500,000,000. The "Tenth Anniversary Review of the Vegetarian Nutritional Research Centre" by its Chairman, Jack W. Lucas, emphasizes the increasing role that the Centre (working in close conjunction with the Science Council of the International Vegetarian Union) plays in connection with international problems of feeding a fast-growing world population. More and more attention is being paid to its findings at scientific meetings and congresses. Its quarterly journal *Plant Food for Human Nutrition* and its information service make it well on the way to gaining

> world-wide recognition as a central focus of essential scientific information about the nutritional importance of plant foods on a global scale.

Mrs. Isabel James, in "Vegetarian Living Why?" relates it to the ideas of natural organic cultivation for which the Soil Association and the Henry Doubleday Research Association stand, as also to the concern shown about factory farming, and the growth of the food reform movement generally.

Such interlinking must give strength to each movement individually, as well as collectively to all, since however they may differ in details of interest and emphasis, they are agreed that it is only by living as part of the great and wonderful balance of nature, that man — the only being with the free-will, the power of choice to work with or go against it — can fulfil his destiny and find his own happiness.

An exhibition of over 160 drawings by Leonardo da Vinci, from the royal collection, held in the Queen's Gallery, Buckingham Palace, London, was reviewed (1 June 1969) by Nigel Gosling, art critic of *The Observer,* who draws an illuminating parallel between Leonardo and present-day artists. He asks himself why it is, though he admires the "blinding genius" of Leonardo as regards intellect and skill, he cannot respond to him as an artist, especially in Leonardo's later developments, where Gosling senses "some basic psychological block":

> The vision is needle-sharp, the technique astounding; but he seems to see these living creatures not as objects of love but as subjects for analysis and anatomizing ... his eye glitters with a surgeon's intensity. If he were alive today I am sure he would be a passionate heart transplanter; his own art is obdurately heartless.

His interest livens when dealing with animals, still more with landscapes, and above all "for sheer electric vitality there is no match for the notes for a bit of machinery or for the excited record of a splayed ventricle." In this medical and scientific probing, this intellectual observation, analysis, and deduction of the phenomena of life, Leonardo is the forerunner of technological science. Comparing his works with those of the Flemish painters, such as Van Eyck and Memlinc ("tender, personal, real, minutely individual yet completely universal") Gosling recognizes the quality that makes Leonardo also the pioneer of "modern" art:

> A lack of proportion and harmony between thinking and feeling, a lack of outgoing warmth, inversion resulting from over-intellectualizing, dryness where there should be juice.

Eric Newton wrote of the "puritanism" of much of modern art. A rebel practising artist, Francis Plummer, complained that art today was more concerned with aesthetics than with art itself, as an expression of mind and soul. Man cannot afford to ignore the real heart aspect of his nature, and too much art, literature, and drama today express that basic betrayal, for which brilliancy is no compensation.